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1. Introduction 
 
Throughout history, natural resource extraction has drawn profit-driven actors to regions rich in 
natural resources. The vital position of natural resources in the global commodity market, and the 
relatively quick source of income their exploitation provides, has even sparked interest towards 
national development models that take advantage of this rent seeking activity. The extraction of 
natural resources has contributed greatly to what Harvey (2010, 310) refers to as accumulation by 
dispossession, taking over vast territories for the exploitation of resources and displacing and 
creating a disruption in the socio-ecological systems of those territories. This developmental model, 
namely extractivism, has further been adopted to meet the needs of the current capitalistic rent-
seeking world order where commodities, production and finance cannot be confined to one space, 
but need to be understood as part of the international and transnational spheres (Gudynas 2010).   
This ’neo-extractivism’, in comparison with the ’old extractivism’, contains a more intensive and 
increased need for foreign capital to function, as well as for the larger involvement of the state. 
Furthermore, fueled by the uncertainty of booms and busts of the resource commodity exporting 
sector, some nation states choose to focus mainly on the neo-extractivist model, making their 
economies rely heavily on crude, natural resource exploitation. Meanwhile, foreign actors are 
drawn to invest their capital in the riches that such countries have. In Latin America, for example, 
this extractivist history has long roots and the increase of left-wing governments of the 2000s and 
many countries around the region have seen extractivism maintain its importance as a model for 
‘development’ (Gudynas 2013). This ‘turn’ has also meant that the discourse about the role and 
style of resource extraction has changed to show how this exploitation can serve the state and its 
people, rather than neoliberalist interests globally (ibid. 2013). This discursive change, and ways 
that it can be employed to conciliate conflicts between the extractivist industry and the state, 
deserves to be studied to see what makes extractivism attractive as an economic model and how 
discourse about resource exploitation and ‘development’ is constructed. 
  
In this thesis I investigate the relationship of neo-extractivism and new extractivist projects that 
seek to keep the extractivist model as a viable way to ‘development’. My aim is to investigate 
whether these projects can ever be completely separated from the involvement of foreign capital 
in the form of investments and aid. What taking on new extractivist projects means in terms of 
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linkages between the national and international actors and how governmental actors create a 
discourse to make sense of this developmental model functions as the overarching problematic of 
this thesis. A case for this investigation is taken from Venezuela where these phenomena meet in a 
relevant way in the new mining ventures that the country has been promoting since 2016 through 
an attempt of an overhauling reform of the oil-based economy of the country. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the involvement of foreign capital in Venezuela’s new 
mining industry in the Orinoco Mining Arch (AMO1), the flagship megaproject of the new mining 
ventures. Specifically, I direct my attention towards how this increased international involvement 
fits in the governmentally promoted ‘development’ plans that rely heavily on natural resource 
exploitation, and how these plans are articulated by governmental actors related to mining 
activities. To further understand the aforementioned  problematic, I study the link between the 
private (international) and the public (national) and how this relationship is being depicted, justified 
and presented as part of a plan to improve the overall economic and social performance in 
Venezuela.  
  
What follows is an outline of this thesis to give the reader a structural idea of the contents as well 
as clarifying and explaining the important sections of the study. This paper contains six chapters 
which help to structure the thesis and support the arguments that are made in this study about the 
links of extractivist ‘developmental’ plans and foreign capital, impact of change in the structure of 
economic systems based on the notion of natural resource extraction and how all of this is being 
framed and ‘sold’ as a viable system of providing desired ‘developmental’ goals. This section 
concludes Chapter 1 of the thesis which is used to discuss about the purpose of the thesis, giving it 
the background required and introducing the concepts and methodologies that are further 
examined in the chapters to follow. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework and the needed 
investigative tools connected to the mining and petroleum industries and its international 
investments in Venezuela, which serves as the case for this study. The following chapters delve 
deeper into the research using the background provided here. 
Chapter 3 further explores the concepts and theoretical context that this study operates in. 
The chapter introduces the concept of extractivism as well as how we can speak of neo-extractivism 
 
1 I will often refer to the Mining Arch with this abbreviation that comes from the original Spanish name of the Arch: 
Arco Minero del Orinoco. 
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when referring to mining policies of some countries that do not operate under the exact rules of the 
extractivism of old but still form part of the extractivist model. I further emphasize the connection 
of the core concepts of extractivism and foreign capital as well as bind these together under a 
developmentalist ontology. I also make a case for why all of these features play a significant role in 
the building of particular developmental discourse(s) and which theoretical concepts are needed to 
understand it, all of which can be better understood through the case study that follows. 
Chapter 4 re-introduces the methodology of this thesis. It does so by going back to a 
discussion about critical discourse analysis (CDA). Therefore, the chapter discusses the ontological 
background of the research and its methods, by leaning on a tradition of post-structuralist thought 
and the idea of discourse as constituting much, if not all, of human action and societies. 
Furthermore, the chapter further presents the tools used and the rationale behind using the chosen 
method of discourse analysis and its complementary tools in the analysis of the new extractivist 
turn and the role of foreign capital involved in it. Lastly, in this chapter I introduce the data I use for 
the CDA, based on the publications and communications of the Venezuelan governmental 
authorities related to the mining sector. 
Chapter 5 introduces the case and the related relevant information. This is done by building 
a historical overview on the natural resource exploitation in Venezuela – from building the rent 
seeking extractivism through oil to the current crisis and proposed solution of mining. The chapter 
focuses on some key aspects from which the extractivist model takes its strength: the long historical 
building of the concept of the ‘Petro-State’, the nationalization processes throughout the nation’s 
political history, and the involvement of international actors as well as some consideration how 
these have contributed to the creation of current social imaginaries based on oil exploitation. The 
chapter is a broad overview and it serves to provide the necessary background for the Venezuelan 
model that is needed in order to contextualize the nation’s governmental discourse on natural 
resource extraction.  
Chapter 6 explains Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on the chosen data of the activation of 
the Orinoco Mining Arch. In this chapter the data is dissected into manageable parts. Firstly, it 
consists of showing important results of the CDA and secondly, it builds on those findings through 
the introduced theoretical concepts of chapter two, relating together those concepts and the 
particular case with the research questions of this thesis. The final chapter offers concluding remarks 
and positions itself in the tradition of CDA by building these conclusions through the outcomes of 
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the case in Venezuela. I close with an established an argument for the importance of understanding 
extractivism as a part of a particular ontology reproduced by hegemonic discourse. 
  
 
2. Research questions, approach and methods 
 
In this thesis, I investigate the Venezuelan government’s intents to promote the mining industry as 
an alternative for the country’s highly oil-based export economy. I study this shift through the 
following question: 
 
What kind of a governmental discourse is established around new natural resource exploitation 
(mega)projects, and how does this discourse address the role of foreign capital? 
 
My focus, and interest, in this thesis is the national context of resource-rich countries, associated 
with the concept of ‘neo-extractivism2’ The above is based on the following hypothesis. The opening 
up of territory for large-scale mining is reproducing the neo-extractivist turn of Venezuela that 
enables the international influence and control of profits and resources according to the global 
capitalist system. This phenomenon, however, masked in the discourse of the government that 
intends on re-establishing natural resource exploitation as a part of ‘development’ of other 
economic sectors and the well-being of the population in an intensely national context de-
emphasizes the role of foreign capital. This hypothesis creates a strong need for studying the 
discursive elements of governmental actions. 
 
I unravel this question through the example of Venezuela´s new Orinoco Mining Arch project. To 
further investigate this question, it is necessary to briefly address the existing research and literature 
that complement and support this thesis. Firstly, recognizing literature on the problems of resource 
dependent economies, such as the ‘resource curse’ and ‘Dutch disease’3, is important and these 
debates are addressed in the Venezuelan context as well (for example, Rosales 2016). However, as 
this paper’s focus is on the discursive side of extractivism, the debates on resource dependency and 
 
2 This concept is explained in the following chapter. 
3 For a discussion about the effects of natural resources on economies and the theorization and critique of resource 
curse arguments, as well as the ‘Dutch disease’, see Obeng-Odoom (2012) and Costa & Santos (2013), for example.  
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the economic structure are intentionally left in the background so as to give way to this focus. 
Secondly, understanding the Venezuelan oil commodity-based export economy is needed to first 
conceptualize these debates before going in-depth on the particular case of the AMO and mining. 
The Venezuelan oil sector and its overall importance in Venezuelan history and economic and 
societal contexts has indeed been researched4, as well as the discursive side of Venezuelan politics 
and especially ‘Chavist populism’5. There is, however, scarce literature on how these two connect, 
especially in the post-Chavist era and in the new AMO project. There is research about the AMO as 
well by authors6 who recognize its significance for environmental damage, conflicts, problems in 
local contexts, illegalities and other themes, whose contribution is also present in this study. 
Furthermore, Rosales (2016) and Sánchez (2010) raise questions about the role of new international 
actors like China, Russia and Turkey, who and whose state-owned companies have an increasingly 
important role in the world of resource extraction, and thus, in the AMO. The contribution of this 
thesis is, then, to research the discursive side of the Venezuelan mining ventures and thus 
contribute to the research of a new phenomenon which, for its novelty, calls for further research.  
  
I have now outlined the starting position and questions for this thesis as well as introduced 
the necessary background and necessary concepts and theories, all of which I will study in detail in 
the chapters to come. A brief introduction to methodology and the particular case-example is 
present in this chapter, as well, to further give context on what is to follow and to alert the reader 
of the underlying background and assumptions that this context brings with it to the investigation, 
to the examination of findings and the analysis of results presented at the end of the thesis. As 
stated before, there are plenty of interesting topics to study when it comes to extractivism as well 
as Venezuela with the volatile situation affecting life on many socio-economic and -ecological ways. 
This thesis does not pretend to be any larger than it can and, therefore, focuses on a set of 
phenomena that may bring contributions to a larger set of knowledge that many researchers have 
provided and keep providing.  
 
 
4 Teran-Mantovani, Also The political economy of natural resources and development: from neoliberalism to resource 
nationalism, edited by Paul A. Haslam and Pablo Heidrich. 
5 For example, Rodner 2016 and Abi-Hassan 2015, Love & Windsor 2018. 
6 Teran-Mantovani 2018 and Rosales 2016 for example. 
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3. Developmentalism through extractivism 
 
 
This chapter establishes the theoretical concept of neo-extractivism and links it to other concepts 
in order to create a framework for this thesis which is amplified in Chapter 4. I start by introducing 
extractivism, a proposed economic model (among other explanations) of intense natural resource 
exploitation, that is used to explain the behavior, actions and realities in many resource dependent 
countries and areas of the world. This knowledge is important as this thesis takes on the topic of a 
huge mining project in one of the most resource dependent economies in the world. However, it is 
also important for the fact that Venezuela with many other countries in the Latin American region 
are used as an example for a new type of extractivism, namely neo-extractivism. Along this chapter, 
I go through the debate on the differences between these terms as well as the entire terminology 
of what is meant by extractivism. The goal is to show the interconnectedness of discourses about 
extractivism and development and thus create a theoretical basis that allows for the analysis and 
investigation in this study. For the purpose of research in this particular case, one feature of 
extractivism is highlighted in its own section of this chapter, foreign involvement. However, other 
important conditions are introduced as well and further examined later on in the case study.  
 
In the following sections, I introduce the features of this extractivist theoretical model that are 
relevant for this thesis. These include introducing ‘extractivism’ and especially the wave of ’new 
extractivism’ as referred to by Gudynas (2010), which is an important premise and theoretical 
backbone of this study. After this framework is established, I first connect the ’new extractivism’ to 
foreign investments and the Venezuelan context. I argue that it is necessary to understand the AMO 
case through this perspective of neo-extractivism and that foreign investments are necessary for 
keeping the extractivist model a viable system for the Venezuelan government to continue pursuing. 
I explore this phenomenon through how it manifests itself in rhetoric and discourse on the 
Venezuelan governmental side and how this described necessity and change is being represented 
by governmental actors.  Furthermore, the concept of developmentalism is vital in understanding 
the way instruments like extractivist industries are traditionally used to promote perceived 
‘positive’, in a very strong normative discourse, change in societies. The considerations of this 
chapter are divided in four short subchapters in order to help formulate an understanding of 
extractivism as part of the said ontology.  The sections discuss the following themes:  1) Extractivism 
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and its basic elements, 2) neo-extractivism that has arisen especially in some Latin American 
’progressive’ governments, 3) the importance of foreign involvement in the system, and 4) the 
importance of considering neo-extractivism as an ontological concept instead of investigating it as 
exclusive an economic model.  
 
3.1. Extractivism as an economic model 
 
” There are certain extractivist activities, such as large-scale ore mining for example, that can 
never be made “sustainable” because their very essence is destructive”. (Acosta 2013, 63)  
 
Eduardo Gudynas (2010, 1) characterizes extractivism as a “style of development based on the 
appropriation of Nature” which manifests itself in the intensive extraction of unprocessed natural 
resources, and contends that activities of this type have a long history in resource rich Latin 
American countries. These activities are mostly recognized as those related to minerals and 
hydrocarbons, like in Venezuela, but can also mean other sectors that focus on the exploitation of 
natural resources – Gudynas (2010) gives an example of the Argentinian agricultural extractivism, 
for example. Acosta (2013) includes forestry and fishing to the list as well. Extractivist economies 
tend to often rely on exporting unprocessed (or processed in a limited way) natural resources 
(Gudynas 2010). Additionally, extractivism has become to be viewed increasingly as a “…concept 
that enables the examination and articulation of deeper underlying logics of exploitation and 
subjectification that are central to the present conjuncture of capitalist globalization and 
neoliberalism” (Junka-Aikio & Cortes-Severino 2017, 177).  What can be learned from these 
explanations of extractivism, for the purpose of this study, to create a stronger understanding of 
what extractivist policies mean to a nation and society, is that extractivism promotes largely export 
based monocultural economic activities, perpetuates socio-ecological destruction and conflict and 
creates new definitions of land ownership and state sovereignty through deterritorialization in favor 
of extractivist industries and actors operating within it (ibid. 2010).  
The connection between colonialism and neocolonialism and the process of extractivism is, and 
especially previously has been, strongly tied to exporting the extracted resources elsewhere 7 , 
 
7 All forms of extractivism do not necessarily focus on uniquely exporting the resources abroad as export (see the 
wider conceptualization of extractivism by Junka-Aikio & Cortes-Severino 2017) but, as stated in this thesis, it is indeed 
recognized as one of the common and frequent features of extractivism and is an important feature in the Venezuelan 
oil and mineral extraction ventures. 
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mainly to the global North, and created few benefits to the place of origin of said resources (Acosta 
2013). The latter part becomes important in understanding the definition of extractivism because, 
regardless of the particular form of extractivism or the extraction of a particular resource, the 
benefit of extractivism yields very limited benefits in local contexts (Gudynas 2010) Acosta (2013), 
along with many others8 connect this long historical continuum of extractive practices to many 
socio-environmental problems in areas that are highly extractivist-oriented. Accumulation of wealth 
to few, poverty, environmental degradation, dispossession and many other phenomena are 
connected to extractivism through the distortion and destruction it causes in the socio-ecological 
and economic spheres (ibid 2013). The mentioned monocultural economic tendency towards raw 
products not only deteriorates other sectors, forcing imports of many basic products, but also 
subjects nations practicing it to the ’mercy’ of the global market where prices of raw resources 
fluctuate greatly (Gudynas 2010) - Gudynas (2010, 5) characterizes the consequent poor position of 
resource-dependent countries of South America on the global market as maintaining the 
“international subordination of South America”. Furthermore, a change into a monocultural 
extractivist system entails a wide array of environmental and social problems that are especially 
aggravated in the local context where extractivism is practiced the most intensely (Ehrnström-
Fuentes 2019). These include, but are not limited to, the loss of biodiversity, the contamination of 
water systems and increased pollution, including due to increased transport and infrastructure 
projects related to extraction of resources (Acosta 2013, Gudynas 2010, Svampa 2013). 
Furthermore, extractive industries contribute to the loss of livelihoods and identity-related issues 
of local people through generating social conflicts, loss of access to land, damage to environment 
and deterioration of local markets and coercive tactics by corporations (Ehrnström-Fuentes 2019, 
Svampa 2013). 
Extractivist policies have, however, seen changes in the hands of multiple governmental actors 
over time. Especially in Latin America some progressive governments have challenged neoliberal 
models of development and demanded for participatory processes that consider and respect the 
environment and national contexts and sovereignty within them. A new extractivism, neo-
extractivism as it is called in academia, has arisen to describe the process. In the following section 
the term is studied further. This brief introduction to extractivism gives a basis for the following 
 
8 Gudynas (2010), Brand, Dietz & Lang (2016). Also, Moore (2017) through his forms of accumulation of wealth and 
‘commodity frontiers’. 
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definition of the important features that make extractivism a base for a large-scale developmental 
policy and, therefore, is fundamental in understanding the discourse studied in this thesis. I argue, 
following Gudynas’ definition of extractivism, that extractivism is not just an economic model based 
on the extraction of resources from the ground – rather, it forms part of a larger way of 
understanding the world and thus reproduces a framework of developmentalist ontology that has 
larger impacts on understanding policies that lean on extractivism, especially through discursive 
practices. 
 
3.2. Neo-extractivism 
 
Extractivist activities, that have historically relied heavily on the liberalization of the extractivist 
sectors, have traditionally been criticized by the Latin American leftist and progressive movements. 
Such criticism, however, has not translated into any fundamental changes in the way the economy 
was structured after these groups formed governments in many Latin American countries, including 
Venezuela (Gudynas 2010). Additionally, Gudynas notes that it is remarkable that entirely new 
extractivist sectors are being promoted in these nations – Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil given as 
examples. More recently, the 2016 launch of the AMO in Venezuela brings this new addition to the 
list of leftist and progressive governments increasing the extractivist tendencies and expanding 
them to new frontiers. In fact, Gudynas (2010) argues that the exploitation of natural resources in 
these countries has surpassed traditional extractivism to form a wider project of ’new extractivism’. 
What makes ’new extractivism’ new is the fact that, in addition to maintaining development through 
the ”appropriation of nature” and being highly dependent on ”international involvement”, the state 
is now the main actor and participates in activities to gain legitimacy through redistributing the 
revenues gained through this system to its inhabitants while maintaining the destructive tendency 
to the socio-ecological sphere of the older models of extractivism (ibid. 2010). Therefore, a shift 
towards neo-extractivist policies means a developmental model that continues with the destructive 
tendencies of the past and simultaneously requires foreign capital and state involvement in order 
to maintain this model ’legitimate’ – on one side through the required financing and on the other 
creating national ’development’, respectively. Understanding this extractivist logic is fundamental 
when further analyzing the discourse in Venezuela.  
Thirdly, the new ’neo-extractivism has at its very core the idea of concentrating the extractivist 
industries in the hands of the state. This includes efforts to nationalize resources, creating state 
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owned sectorial companies, clearer legislation on natural resource exploitation and higher taxation 
to “capture surpluses” (Gudynas 2010). This role of the state and its difference concerning a 
fundamental impact on a developmental model is questionable, though. Despite the increase in the 
role of the state, operating in the commercial profit-making sphere, the state’s actions resemble 
more and more those of private companies and ‘joint ventures’, present in Venezuela, putting the 
primacy of the state in question (ibid. 2010). What is true, however, is the increased attention on 
the distribution of the surplus by the state that it gets as a part of the neo-extractivist actor in the 
natural exploitation business. Gudynas characterizes the redistribution of this surplus to social 
programs as “one of the possibly most distinctive aspects of neo-extractivism” (ibid. 2010, 8) which 
creates a connection between the natural resource sector and the social programs of the state. 
Through this connection, we can see the relationship between the private and the public and 
supposed legitimacy of the whole system – the very question this thesis has set out to investigate. 
 Hence, taking into account the historical liberalization of natural resources, the need for 
foreign investment9, the destruction of nature and the changing nature of state actors functioning 
like their private-sector counterparts, there is a large similarity in the way extractivism and neo-
extractivism work. Gudynas (2010) emphasizes the difference between these two models, marking 
the role the state has taken in neo-extractivism as a significant change from the older model, while 
acknowledging the similarities. According to Acosta (2013, 63), “beyond a few differences of greater 
or lesser importance, the extractivist mode of accumulation seems to be at the heart of the 
production policies of both neoliberal and progressive governments”, which indicates towards an 
understanding of the two phenomena forming part of  a larger (belief) model based on the idea of 
accumulation of wealth, close to that of Harvey’s ’accumulation by dispossession’ or Moore’s 
description of capitalist accumulation 10 . Finally, Brand et al. (2016) see both phenomena as 
manifestations of the same extractivist developmental model that manifests itself differently 
depending on the specific moments in different countries, pointing out that the mayor differences 
are tied to the forms of government. The authors conclude (Brand et al. 2016, 131) that  “we 
deliberately talk only of neo-extractivism, referring to a development model that is embedded in a 
specific historical phase of capitalist development where nature and its valuation in the world market 
 
9 Section 3.3. of this chapter. 
10 Harvey (2010), Moore (2018). These concepts contribute much on the ontology of the current system of production 
and accumulation of wealth. For this thesis, however, their complex contribution, including world-ecology and other 
debates, will not be addressed further.  
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play a decisive role for the realization of exchange value, and which exhibits commonalities across 
different political regimes.” 
This is the approach that I take in this thesis as well – to see extractivism as part of a larger 
developmental model that is tightly tied to the capitalist, neoliberal, ontology. The differences 
should be noted as important, however, not as an ontology-level difference but rather forming an 
integral part of the way these neo-extractivist progressive governments are able to operate in this 
capitalist system through legitimization of their operations. In the following sections, I explore 
important features of (neo)extractivism11 that are the focus of this thesis. 
 
3.3. Foreign capital in the extractivist model 
 
The aforementioned position and, thus, subordination on the global market is but one of the ways 
in which national extractivism is tied to international processes. In this thesis I am interested, above 
all, in the international involvement within the national extractivist context and, therefore, the most 
important aspects of neo-extractivism related to the said phenomenon is examined as follows. 
All models of extractivism are highly dependent on foreign investments due to providing the 
globalized market with little more than primary products (Gudynas 2010). Veltmeyer (2013) argues 
that not only is natural resource extraction observable in the strategies of very different regime 
types (from neoliberal to Venezuelan post-neoliberal), the reliance on exports and investments 
follows due to the inherent nature of extractivism. Furthermore, Veltmeyer (2013) maintains that 
investments do not seem to be particularly in favor of any regime type when it comes to the 
willingness to extract resources. In fact, Gudynas (2010) confirms this by stating that new 
“progressive governments”, referring to Venezuela, Bolivia and others that have seen the rise of 
left-wing governments in Latin America, have not opted for a fundamental change concerning 
extractivist policies of the former governments and have actually increased the exploitation of 
national resources.  
Consequently, one of the strongest actors, in any form of extractivism, are the transnational 
corporations (TNCs) that seek opportunities in the extraction of these resources and exposing them 
to the global market. Extractivism, due to its reliance on raw natural resources, works on two levels 
 
11 From now on just the terms neo-extractivism and extractivism are often used to understanding the current process 
of Venezuela and many other Latin American societies, recognizing the aforementioned similarities and differences 
between the ’classical’ and ’neo’ forms of the phenomenon.  
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of foreign involvement, export (and import of the products that, due to extractivist industry, are not 
produced in the country) and investment (Gudynas 2010). Thus, the role of foreign capital and the 
presence of TNCs in the territories where natural resources are present is one of the largest 
questions and problematics of extractivism when thinking of a range of questions from territorial 
unity and sovereignty to national ’development’. In fact, due to extractivism and the difficult access 
to resources, TNCs usually operate in enclaves, bringing little benefits to the larger outside national 
communities, and due to the primacy of natural resource exploitation of the national economy, can 
exercise mayor influence in the country’s politics as well (Acosta 2013). The social and ecological 
problems arising from this type of economic activity of an entirely isolated TNC-operations in a 
deterritorialized state, where responsibility is spread ambiguously between the TNC, the state and 
other potential actors, is well reported (ibid. 2013). Furthermore, during a decline in prices of 
natural resources, countries tend to need foreign capital even more to maintain their extractivist 
mode of production viable, resulting in larger concessions to the TNCs as a way to attract 
investments (Brand et al. 2016). 
 This importance of foreign capital in discussions about developmental topics is therefore a 
significant part of debates, especially in discussions about the mining sector and the investments of 
multinational corporations to that sector (Banks 1993). Following Gudynas’ introduction to 
extractivism introduced above, I look into investments through their links to the mentioned concept 
of natural resource exploitation. In the background of my approach, there lies the notion that 
investments are to be viewed in the light of the rupturing potential of extractivist policies, mostly in 
the national context, and hence deny the notion of the ’neoclassical’ economic theories that 
emphasize multinationals and their investments as ’beneficial’ to economic development , or even 
the overall ’development’ of the nation (ibid. 1993). The important notion to grasp here is that 
foreign capital, be it in the form of investments, aid or other, has a strong impact on national policies 
in giving influence and power to TNCs in the national sphere of influence. This ceding of the state’s 
sovereignty to foreign actors is especially important in contexts where a national policy and 
discourse is being built around a strong criticism of the neoliberal order. There are many other forms 
through which extractivist economies are tied to international capital, often in neocolonial terms. 
For this thesis, the importance of international capital in the analysis comes from the understanding 
that it is fundamentally connected to the process of securing the investments needed for production 
and revenue through the logic of extractivism. Understanding the negative impacts that this system 
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causes is important as well as understanding that progressive governments of Latin America often 
go against this same system of neoliberal privatization: 
 
“One sees, then, a peculiar relationship in that the state seeks to capture surpluses from extractivism, 
and then uses part of them in these social programs, managing to use this social legitimacy to defend 
its extractive activities. In other words, although these governments can be said to have distanced 
themselves from the classical Left by their support of conventional extractivism, they return to the 
Left and manage to justify themselves as progressives because of their social programs. At the same 
time, these social activities need increasing financing, and thus these same governments become 
dependent on extractivism to capture financial resources. This becomes one of the factors explaining 
the support of these activities and the persistent search for foreign investment.” (Gudynas 2010, 8) 
 
It is through this element of neo-extractivism, a rather unique relationship, that this thesis bases its 
questions on. The last element that I introduce here indicates the discursive focus and ties neo-
extractivism to a larger ontology that I base the analysis on and that is later introduced in chapter 
four. 
 
3.4. Neo-extractivism, developmentalism and ontology  
 
Through the work of the authors presented above, the underlying mechanism of neo-extractivism 
does not present any new revolutionary ways of understanding the world. Rather, a neo-extractivist 
model, through its focus on economic development and then redistributing the revenue gained, 
seen in this light starts to resemble developmentalist ideas. By ’developmentalism’ I do not solely 
refer to the economic model that many economists have considered to be the popular modus 
operandi of the last decades when concerning the goals to achieve ’development’ in the Global 
South (Nederveen Pieterse 1991); rather, I refer to the authors who go beyond this categorization 
to enforce the link between developmentalism and neo-extractivism, for developmentalism is not 
merely an economic model come and gone – rather, it is part of an ontology of neoliberalism that 
emphasizes the primacy of economy. This link is important when studying the way neo-extractivist 
policies are being carried out and exposing the ’old tricks’ of neoliberalism in the discourse of neo-
extractivism. 
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 Several authors12 point out the pervasive nature of developmentalism, creating a larger 
understanding of the phenomenon as something that can cover many different policies without 
contradicting its overall message. The word ’development’ already in itself contains a significant 
historical and normative burden and it is from this tradition of ’development’ that 
developmentalism seems to gain strength. Rather than an ’out-of-fashion’ economic model, 
developmentalism becomes something more – a belief in something better, ’development’. 
Consequently, Nederveen Pieterse (1991) sees that developmentalism means giving primacy to 
economic solutions in fixing problems in other sections of society and involves the normative idea 
of ‘development’, a term that is ambiguous and without much meaning without a context but 
always in conventional developmentalist understanding referring to a positive change. 
Furthermore, development thinking has at its background a discourse of modernity and 
modernization theory (Koponen et al 2007, 54-55, 60-62). In fact, when identifying 
developmentalism to a condition of Western ‘modernity’, development can be seen as a social 
construction that has no objective meaning outside discourse (Ramírez-Cendrero 2018). This belief 
in (primarily economically produced) ‘development’ has long roots and reached a high point in the 
1970s that the United Nations had named the “decade of development” (Wallerstein 2005). 
However, to think that developmentalism has ceased to exist just because the terminology of 
development has changed, I argue, is erroneous. As follows, I present the authors to support this 
stance which helps this thesis to build on the foundation that focuses on the ontological position of 
which neo-extractivism is a manifestation. 
First of all, the characterization of developmentalism by Gudynas functions as a guideline for 
perceiving developmentalism as pervasive: “But the idea of development is very resistant. Just as 
broad sectors of civil society were criticizing it, there were others demanding access to development, 
or calling for more development. Each new developmentalist vision – with neoextractivism being the 
most recent – serves to keep that dream alive” (Gudynas 2013, 28). Not only is developmentalism 
recognized as an over-encompassing ideological position on the power of ’development’, Gudynas 
directly links neo-extractivism as a manifestation of the same.  
 Secondly, Adaman et al. (2019) discuss the relationship between activism and neoliberalism 
where the latter remains a hegemonic position by extending its discourse to state institutions 
brought along by the former. In other words, neo-extractivism means a larger involvement of the 
 
12 For example, Gudynas 2010, Acosta 2013, Lander 2013, Ramírez-Cendrero 2018.  
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state and some reorganization of economic activities but only when following the ’rules’ of 
neoliberal discourse, the belief in the primacy of economic solutions to social problems – the 
authors name this “neoliberal developmentalism” (ibid. 2019, 5). In this definition, all three terms 
can be linked together under the same problem of the ontological position of neoliberalism which 
further implies a depoliticization through economization. Neo-extractivism and neoliberalism are 
not conflicted, and are in fact part of the same, because ” [o]nce human behavior is conceptualized 
as a form of cost-benefit calculus, neoliberalism can accommodate a range of theoretical and 
political positions with diverse policy implications, including those that can be identified as state 
interventionism” (ibid. 2019, 5). 
My intention with this section has been to show how neo-extractivism is tied to a 
conventional neoliberalist ontology that supports economic measures over others and show this 
link through developmentalism. I made this choice to show that at the base of neo-extractivist 
discourse lies neoliberalism. In addition, developmentalism is present to ‘manage’ neoliberalism 
and confine the discussion to a feature of neoliberalist thought closest to this thesis, namely 
’development’. I deem the rather small scale of the introduction to these terms enough for the 
purposes of this study in order to give space to the actual focus. The space in this thesis limits the 
treatment of the topic but it needs to be acknowledged that with the presentation above, I have 
steered the attention towards a larger scale ontological problem of ’development’ and 
neoliberalism to understand that terms such as these do not present universalities but are rather 
only interpretations, filled with normativity. Political positions and contextual and temporal 
contexts (neo-extractivism) can then be seen as discursive manifestations of something larger. This 
view helps with the analysis of the Venezuelan situation significantly, as is demonstrated after 
delving further into the discursive features of this research in Chapter 4. 
 
As we have seen, conceptualizing neo-extractivism is a complex process. In this chapter I have 
intended to introduce the main features that researchers agree upon are part of extractivism and 
revealed some differences in categorizing the phenomenon. Thus, the main take from this chapter 
is, firstly, the acknowledgement of developmentalism and the neoliberal processes behind it and 
their connection to extractivism which, however ’reformed’ it might be, relies on the old ’belief’ in 
(economic and then other forms of) development. This part is the framework for this thesis which 
becomes clearer when connected with the method of critical discourse analysis of this thesis. At the 
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same time, it is worth mentioning that the developmentalist ontology presented here represents 
but one way (yet perhaps still the most widespread) of understanding the ’reality’ around us. Many 
other (local, indigenous and wider spread) forms exist that challenge it in many ways. As this thesis 
deals with the matter of governmental discourse, these other forms are excluded from the analysis 
except for when the context so requires. In the case of Venezuela, we will later see a construction 
of a discourse on alternatives to a neoliberal model. It is important to acknowledge this (although 
justified) lack of other considerations to fortify my position as giving a critique to the hegemonic 
ontology of neoliberalist developmentalism and not as attributing its economic theses as any more 
of a ’real’ value for constructing ‘reality’ as any other ontology. 
 Secondly, looking at extractivism through the presented elements we can find two important 
guidelines for this study that make the understanding of neo-extractivism fundamental: first, the 
state’s reliance on natural resource extraction and exportation for maintaining social programs and 
rent distribution, and second, the role of international capital in this process. Furthermore, these 
elements were presented to indicate that neo-extractivism is a complex model that encompasses 
societies in a way that goes beyond the economic sector. This has implications when acknowledging 
the seemingly impossible relation between the two important parts of the process and through this 
relation it introduces interesting questions to studying the ways neo-extractivism can be legitimized 
by the government. 
This thesis’s focus is on Venezuela because of the interest I have towards the extremely 
complicated situation the country faces due to its extractivist history and its economic structure 
that heavily relies on this extraction of resources. This study is a small contribution to creating a 
wider understanding of a societal, economic and political context that could easily be simplified 
through events unfolding and being reported about the situation at the time of the writing of the 
thesis. The idea of this thesis is to show that events that can seemingly be simplified to a set of 
rather a-historically based political decisions do hide a complicated (historical) set of processes and 
events that spur from the hegemonic discourses of that context. This is important in order to further 
study the situation in Venezuela, or in fact, other contexts where extractivism is present under a 
certain set of conditions that become evident throughout this thesis. 
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4. Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
A basic requirement in research is that it establishes its framework to justify the choices in the 
study, its methods of analysis and a larger theoretical and scientific position. This chapter intends 
on doing just that by establishing the epistemological and ontological position of the thesis through 
introducing the methodology and tools of analysis used in this study. As this thesis focuses on the 
way new extractivist projects are presented and justified by governmental actors, that have strongly 
positioned themselves against the hegemonic economic model represented by the international 
actors investing in the very same extractivist project, language becomes an integral part of research. 
To study these discursive elements of natural resource policies, I lean on the strong tradition of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that is well established in the social sciences. In this chapter I firstly 
present the broader analytical framework of the thesis by simultaneously introducing the tradition 
of discourse analysis. Secondly, I introduce a more specific way to employ the potential of CDA to 
the purposes of this study by drawing from the ideas of Fairclough’s (1992) methods of analyzing 
discourse. Following this, the broader justification of the data, where I explain the reasons for 
selecting this set of data and the process of collecting it. I also build the basis for Chapter 5, the data 
analysis and discussion. Consequently, the research questions are explored in light of the discursive 
approach introduced in this chapter.  
 
 
4.1. ’Discourse’ in the discourse analysis 
 
“If a researcher is interested in the ways in which knowledge is formulated and validated by society 
as truth, then discourse analysis is likely an excellent methodology to use.” (Dittmer 2010, 275). 
These words by Dittmer about the usability of discourse analysis in research based on discovering 
‘truths’, taken-for-granted assumptions on the functioning of societies, power relations and actors 
within this complex discursive world functions as a clear introduction to what this thesis aspires to, 
following the tradition of CDA. When a goal is as broad as studying “the ways in which knowledge is 
formulated and validated by society as truth”, it is of extreme importance, for the clarity of the study 
and for the ease of the reader, to state the premises, the framework of the study, as well as explain 
what is meant by the concepts, words and terminology used. ‘Truth’ and ‘knowledge’ are after all 
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words with no trivial importance when creating an understanding of the societies around us as 
“truth” in discourse analysis is not an objective concept and rather a feature of a particular 
discourse, and knowledge can be pursued with a wide array of methodological means.  
 Forming a part of research in development studies, and in social sciences in general, this 
study goes beyond the linguistic notions and analysis of discourse, in order to contribute to the 
understanding of power relations and how truths are created and maintained in socially specific 
situations. To understand this difference, it is to be noted that academically the terminology here 
can be divided into two different ‘discourses’ - the ‘discourse’ and ‘Discourse’ 13(Dittmer 2010, 275). 
Discourse (capitalized) becomes the (albeit difficult) subject of study which, according to Dittmer 
(ibid., 275) is the “culturally-specific mode of existence” and is therefore the one that groups lower 
case discourses under a larger term from which meanings and power relations can be observed. In 
this study, I have introduced this categorization mainly to affirm the existence of these two different 
ways people use to refer to discourse in different situations. Additionally, they are presented as 
distinct elements as I use both in the present research. They also function as a way to clarify the 
difference of textual elements and the practices and imaginaries they create, when forming the 
framework for this thesis. The understanding of this thesis about discourse falls closer to the upper-
case Discourse and, therefore, when discourse as a term is used, it is referred to that Discourse. 
Small case discourse here is understood more as textual discursive elements that form discourses 
and is not in my study referred to as discourse. 
  
4.2. Discursive theory of social processes  
 
Having defined my interpretation and use of the complex field of the word ‘discourse’, it is now my 
intention to demonstrate what is the foundational ontological approach to discourse in this study. 
As Dittmer (2010, 276) states, discourse analysis is not a simple tool that has one uniform way of 
understanding the world and tools to unveil it, but rather hosts two larger approaches to discourse 
 
13 Firstly, the linguistic, lower case discourse which consists of the “phrasing and word choice that is associated with 
‘language-in-use’” (Gee, 1999, 7 in Dittmer 2010, 275)and ”the ways in which issues and spaces are framed through this 
textual form of discourse are of importance, as this is the most empirically observable aspect of language’s impact on, 
and constitution of , the social world” (ibid. 2010, 275). Secondly, the upper-case Discourse constitutes to the process 
“through which these ‘truths’ [the ones established in the discourse] become embodied and enacted” (ibid. 2010, 275). 
 
 
19 
  
analysis based on their view on discourse’s relation with ‘reality’ – the structuralist and post-
structuralist strands of thought. These differences are not trivial for the nature of discourse in 
relation to agency, and structure has consequences in the focus of the analysis and in the overall 
positioning of the thesis on the ontological and epistemological spectrum.  
 The main differences in positioning these two strands of thought, for the sake of this study, 
are the ways they treat discourse’s relation to subjects, agency and power. The structuralist view, 
leaning heavily on Marxist thought and the work of Gramsci, emphasizes class and places (cultural) 
hegemony and ideology as constitutive of the discursive reality in which discourse’s effects exist 
only after “ontologically prior” subjects (Dittmer 2010, 276). Whereas many structuralists focus on 
the macro-level, poststructuralism, influenced by Foucault and his notion of ‘governmentality’, 
focuses on micro-level manifestations and sees individual subjectivities being just as affected and 
created by discourses, leading to an understanding where ideology is but one part of what 
constitutes a discourse and where discourse is even more tied to a space and time and hides in it 
multiple, shifting subjectivities (ibid. 2010, 276). It is worth noting, however, that constraining the 
variety of discourse in what has been described here does not constitute the full extent of 
academics. Attempts to combine aspects of both, or just to reposition one of the two through 
debates between the two approaches, has brought forth many ways to make sense of the role of 
discourse and all what comes with it. I next introduce the key notions this thesis leans on, based 
heavily on Laclau and Mouffe. I see this focus on discourse as an essential part of development 
studies and its insistence on relativity and context based situational knowledge, starting from the 
tradition on works like Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism. 
  
“Despite the blurring of theoretical boundaries during many discourse analyses, it is nonetheless 
important to be explicit about the theoretical background that the researcher brings to any project, 
as that background then has bearing on the methodology undertaken in the project” (Dittmer 2010, 
279). 
 
In this thesis I have approached discourse, and the concepts related to analyzing it, by relying on a 
view that is close to the post-structuralist strain of thought. Specifically, I proceed to introduce some 
key background and assumptions, as well as the reasons behind it, through the theory of discourse 
by Laclau and Mouffe (2001). I write this thesis with the goal of understanding better the questions 
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presented earlier and it is not within the capacity of this thesis to engage in large debate over rivaling 
theories of social sciences. It is, nevertheless, important to show the basis for the discourse analysis 
and Laclau and Mouffe can offer much to that end. As follows, I introduce the necessary theory of 
post-structural discourse. 
 Firstly, the large contribution, as stated earlier, of post-structural approach is its focus on 
discourse as a center of what can be understood as existing ’reality’. This, consequently, makes it 
impossible to establish any durable and essential ’true’ projection of reality (Dittmer 2010, 277). 
How is ’reality’ through discourses constituted, then? Laclau and Mouffe offer an explanation by 
explaining discourse through elements, moments and articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 105). 
To briefly summarize the idea: discursive elements are signifiers, subjects, objects, practices that 
have multiple meanings and by themselves contribute to little. However, at the moment of an 
articulation practice individual elements take on specific meanings that fit a specific context 
(becoming moments), excluding the other meanings. At the same time, these articulation practices 
tie together these elements, creating a discursive totality where both the newly created moments 
and the totality have a fixed meaning (Stengel and Nabers 2019). This creation of a discourse 
necessarily requires the exclusion of the other meanings of the elements as the ’Other’ is needed 
to form a discourse just as the ’Self’, but this also means an unstable discourse that is constantly 
threatened by the same excluded outside meanings that help to constitute it (ibid. 2019). This all 
means that discourse (as well as the individual meanings within) are temporary, incomplete and 
unstable and that meanings depend on the context in which they are placed (ibid. 2019). 
Additionally, Laclau and Mouffe conclude that this definition of discourse means that it is not limited 
to linguistic phenomena and, that there is no distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices which gives their theory of discourse a larger ontological theoretical positioning (ibid. 
2001, 107). 
 
Secondly, it is important to know the concept of hegemony before proceeding further as 
hegemonies represent key power relations between discourses. Stengel and Nabers (2019, 255) 
explain how hegemonies become constituted through hegemonization “…when certain discourses 
manage to establish themselves as universally valid”. To understand this concept further, hegemony 
”involves a specific demand (a particularity) functioning as a symbol not only of broad range of social 
demands but also of the (unattainable) ideal of a perfect, that is, fully constituted society (the 
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universal), in which all demands are fulfilled” (ibid. 2019, 255) . A successful hegemony means that 
there is one discourse that claims and has support as the only acceptable way to understanding the 
world (Dittmer 2010). Following the exclusion logic of meanings and discourses, Sutherland (2005, 
190) explains, the position of Laclau and Mouffe as follows: “power struggles reveal points of friction 
between rival political projects and ultimately, between antagonistic world-views. Furthermore, 
challenges to the received wisdom of a given society are depicted as sources of identity crises, in 
which notions generally accepted to be “common sense” are re-evaluated”. The conflictive nature 
of hegemony and antagonisms that Laclau and Mouffe establish serve as an important point when 
analyzing a speech that reproduces hegemonic discourse in fields as conflictive as mining, TNCs and 
development.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the important take from post-structuralism is its negation of 
essentialist universals, the understanding that discourses are tied to specific situations in space and 
time and that there exists a ’plurality of antagonisms’ - responses to hegemony. Analyzing this 
plurality raises questions in any set of data the researcher chooses to work with and in the case of 
this study, that data is a collection of publications and communications of the Venezuelan 
governmental authorities which already creates many implications based on the ontology and 
epistemology originating from this approach. There is the question of power, the identification of 
the discourses and which hegemony(-ies) they represent. Where does the discourse originate from, 
what are its parts and what does it represent? Is the speech itself representing, in fact, an 
antagonism of another hegemonic position? There would be many more questions related to the 
many antagonisms that arise from social movements (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 159) and the 
questions of subordination and oppression related to them. This thesis, due to its limited space, 
focuses instead on discourse through the articulation at the governmental level and what it 
represents as a producer of discourse with relative authority and power.  
  
The focus on governmental actors of this thesis requires a recognition of the power that these actors 
have when (re)producing a certain discourse. For example, the successor of the Venezuelan 
president Hugo Chávez, the current president Nicolás Maduro, through his active role in speaking 
about the country’s mining policy, is participating in a discourse that contributes to how certain 
phenomena are perceived and how certain imaginary is being (re)produced. As an authoritarian 
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leader of a country, that discourse has significant weight and as demonstrated below, represents a 
part in this conflicting relationship between hegemonic and antagonistic discourses under the 
definition of Laclau and Mouffe. Using a post-structuralist starting point, I am able to go beyond the 
materialistic sphere of mining and economic policy and move to the sphere of how certain policies 
can be justified under a certain reproduction of hegemonic discourse. This also means that 
questions that have become technical or otherwise taken for granted are shown in a normative 
light; taking into consideration everything stated above, there is no reason that the extractivist 
policies of Venezuela and the apparent conflict with the public-private interests would be excluded 
from this normative relation. In continuation, I briefly represent the method of the critical discourse 
analysis by Fairclough that I use. There are some important differences in the way that Fairclough 
approaches discourse compared to Laclau and Mouffe. For example, the relation of what constitutes 
a discourse, or discursive moments, for Fairclough is more narrowly defined because he sees 
discourse as one element among others (Fairclough 1992, 63). While Fairclough’s views on discourse 
do not align with those of Laclau and Mouffe, I see no reason why his method of analyzing discourse 
would not fit into the view represented by the two authors as the way I employ Fairclough’s method 
is more a question of a systematic gathering of discourse data rather than that of a larger debate 
on ontology, which these two differing views on the nature of discursivity can evoke in a different 
context outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
4.3. Approaching CDA – three ’pronged’ method by Fairclough  
 
Having introduced the ontological and theoretical basis for the thesis as well as the analytical 
framework of the discourse analysis, I now introduce in more detail the method established by 
Fairclough (1992) for critical discourse analysis. Dittmer (2010, 279) asserts that one difficulty of 
conducting discourse analysis is the fact that few examples of a clear explanation of the process 
itself exist. One of these few explanatory models, however, is the method presented by Fairclough, 
which is based on a ”three-pronged approach”, containing the following three ”prongs”: 1) textual 
analysis, 2) discursive practice and  3) social practice (Dittmer 2010, 283). All the steps are explained 
as follows. 
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 Textual analysis 
 
Fairclough (1992, 74) identifies text analysis under four categories: “vocabulary”, “grammar”, 
“cohesion” and “text structure” and declares that textual analysis focuses both on form and meaning 
in the text. What is important to know for this thesis is that the first level of analysis, that of the 
text, has multiple ways to approach it. As stated above, I do not focus on purely linguistic questions 
on this thesis and, therefore, stay away from deeper analysis of the language in this field. 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that word choices, metaphors, text structure and many other 
categories of textual analysis form an integral part of a discourse. Furthermore, they also constitute 
in the building of imaginaries, reveal knowledge systems and assumptions around a certain 
discourse and create meanings. Whether talking about intentionally chosen and used terms in an 
argumentative text, (like the speeches of this thesis), or unconscious wordings that hide belief-
systems or assumptions, these discursive elements tell much about the overall discourse. Therefore, 
it is of utmost importance that the CDA of this thesis start with an analysis of the text itself. 
 
Discursive practice  
 
The second analytical level works as a ’mediator’ between the micro- (text) and macro-level (social 
practice) of the analysis of processes of discourse (Fairclough 1992, 86). This level contains the 
“processes of text production, distribution and consumption, and the nature of these processes 
varies between different types of discourse according to social factors” (ibid. 1992 86). This means 
that the importance is placed on who produces texts, who they are meant for, who consumes the 
text and in which context of knowledge, tradition and resources these texts are produced and 
interpreted. Consequently, analysis of discursive practice helps to map out, and must be done with, 
the textual analysis, giving sense to the textual elements. Discourse types, larger context and 
intertextuality all reduce the ’ambivalence’ of the discourse that emerges from purely textual 
reading of the elements. Following Foucault, Fairclough (ibid. 1992, 83) explains that through these 
processes, that can contain heavily ideological elements, texts are interpreted by the consumers 
who help to ’patch-up- the meanings of the text and make sense of the text. This complex array of 
discursive elements that gain meaning through contextual discursive practices is linked, therefore, 
to the relativist world constituted by discourses that Laclau and Mouffe present in their work.  
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 Knowing that the first two prongs are fundamentally linked to each other, my analysis moves 
systematically by finding relevant textual features of the material and mapping them out and 
grouping them, and then further analyses them through the second prong. This is the principal of 
the analysis but it is not as simple, though, as assumptions when identifying, grouping and reading 
the textual elements exist with these elements all the time – it is impossible to detach meaning and 
even my own assumptions for the purposes of first categorizing any data. As I am interested in the 
way the governmental discourse ’justifies’ and deal with the apparent conflict of the extractive 
policies of international investment and simultaneous resource nationalism, meanings and 
imaginaries are especially interesting. Moreover, the historical context of natural resources and the 
Bolivarian socialist project of Venezuela bring additional discursive elements that are fundamental 
to the modern discourse and therefore also important components to analyze on both of these 
levels. 
 
Social practice  
 
The last prong is the very representation of the macro-scale part of the analysis. This is the part of 
analysis that draws on the concepts of power and hegemony and focuses on the social practice 
aspect of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, 86) – namely how discourses shape the social world. Here I 
call attention to the previous discussion of the discursive social theory of Laclau and Mouffe which 
works as the basis for understanding this macro-scale analysis. As I have already established the 
theoretical basis to this thesis, here I provide, only some further remarks on the ways that I use 
these concepts in my analysis, combining them with the two earlier prongs. 
 The process of hegemonization serves in the analysis of the data of this study, especially 
when creating an understanding of the discourse that Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro is 
reproducing – identifying hegemonic discourse, how it is reproduced and what the features of it are, 
among other questions. This is also supported by the understanding of the elements that create ’the 
other’ and the antagonisms that stand in opposition to the hegemonic discourse which, on the other 
hand, requires a reaction from the hegemonic discourse in confronting these oppositions. 
   
As we have seen, analyzing discourse is extremely complex. The three prongs identified by 
Fairclough and the ontological positions taken, nevertheless, come in useful especially when 
categorizing and handling the data, from identifying textual elements and situating them in the 
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context of discursive practices  to social practices for a larger conversation. I use all three prongs in 
analyzing the data in this study, as elaborated in the next section.  
  
4.4. Material and methods 
 
With the critical discourse analysis as the chosen approach for the analysis of the findings in this 
study, it is necessary to establish the methods and material on which this analysis is based. In this 
section I introduce both of them through an introduction to the government-based documentation 
that serves as the main source of data for this thesis. 
 I have categorized the material into three separate sections to justify the choice behind each 
of them, dividing them according to the three main types of material that they represent. I have 
identified the three types of material as follows: 1) The opening speech by  president Nicolás 
Maduro at the event to officiate the AMO project, 2) the communications and news articles related 
to this new project published by the country’s Ministry of Mining and 3) the National Development 
Plans’ sections that relate to mining. 
 As all this material constitutes the analysis of the same phenomenon, they are presented 
together, except when highlighting a specific piece of the data in the final analysis and discussion 
section, as their categorization of this chapter is merely to give a sense of the data. 
 
President Maduro opening up the AMO  
 
The opening speech of president Nicolás Maduro at the Venezuelan Central Bank in 2016, where he 
establishes the basis for the new Orinoco Mining Arch and opens it officially for foreign investment, 
serves as an interesting ’text’ for analysis14. The speech was held in the presence of potential 
investors from influential TNCs, Venezuelan governmental actors and representatives as well as 
some local artisanal miners. Furthermore, the entirety of the event was televised and shown live on 
the Venezuelan state-run television station, the VTV, an important point to note considering 
hegemonic formations. The event contained statements by other actors in the mining sector as well, 
who formed the ’panel’ of presenters: the minister of petroleum and mining, the president of the 
Venezuelan state-owned mining company, and the director of the Venezuelan Central Bank, among 
the most important ones, in addition to the president. 
 
14 See appendix A for the said speech. 
 
26 
  
 I chose this particular material for its significance to the AMO project. After reviewing 
material for the analysis, this particular speech by the president at the opening of the AMO project 
fit extremely well with the objects of this study: it is a speech that 1) is presented by a governmental 
authority figure (the president) 2) operates as the introduction to the new extractivist project that 
my research focuses on 3) addresses development strategy in a broader sense in terms of the 
importance of natural resources in the Venezuelan development strategy history (normative, 
assumptions, history) and 4) is directed, at least to a large extent, to the TNCs to invite them to 
participate in the project. As can be seen, the four points of the material reveal already some 
important connections to the discourse analysis that was conducted. I conducted the data analysis 
by first transcribing the speech (as it was not available in written form). 
 
The news articles by the Ministry  
 
The next piece of material is constituted by the communications and news articles published by the 
Ministry of Mining on their Internet-site. I gathered the material from the news archive of the site, 
saved it to a manageable format on the computer and divided the material in two parts.  
Firstly, I investigated all the news stories related to the new mining project from the first 
published article available: from August 2nd, 2016, to March 30th, 201715. The time period chosen 
represents the earliest available news stories published by the newly formed ministry of Mining, 
which coincides with the AMO project’s start. The end date of March 2017 was chosen for two 
reasons. First, I had to limit the amount of material to a manageable amount which, after 42 articles 
at the end of March, seemed justified seeing that the themes and style of writing had recurred 
enough in the articles to serve an understanding of the commonalities in the discursive elements of 
the publications. Secondly, following the speech-material, I analyze the foundational context of the 
new mining ventures, for which I judge that the months that coincide with the launch of the AMO 
project provide a sufficient understanding of the situation.  
 The second part of this material consists of the news articles of the same archive that are 
explicitly about foreign involvement in the new mining projects. This contains publications about 
foreign capital of the first part and, additionally, news that I categorized to have ‘foreign capital’ – 
 
15 Appendix B showcases these news articles. 
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related content, as its main theme until the end of 201716. As only six17 (out of 42) news publications 
of the main part of the data deal mainly with the topic of foreign involvement, the purpose of this 
part of the data is to function more as a manner to check and confirm the findings of the first part 
– i.e. to see, if there are any changes in the discursive elements in the data when twenty additional 
new publications are added to the data. This addition does not mean that I have ignored the fact 
that a lack of news publications of a certain theme does indeed form a part of the analysis. In 
discovering which topic is favored over another by the discourse, is only an additional way of 
checking for possible changes or additions in the discourse that should be taken into account. 
  
The developmental  plans of Venezuela  
 
Lastly, I investigated the Venezuelan Development Plans of 2013-2019 and 2019-202518  which 
establish the wider developmental orientation and goals that the government claims to aspire 
towards. The time periods of the two plans represent a crucial moment in Venezuelan governmental 
aspirations as the earlier plan was released before the plummeting oil prices and the economic and 
social crisis and did not yet include the new focus on mining and the AMO. 
 For the analysis, I looked into the relevant sections of each document, namely the sectoral 
oil and mining plans, compared the documents between each other and with the speech and news 
data presented above. 
 
The presentation of the methodology in this chapter has outlined the importance of discourse 
in research. As the focus is on a particular discourse at a particular time in history, contextual 
information and understanding is needed to be able to create any sense of ’reality’ through the 
discursive elements that are analyzed. To understand the discourse of governmental actors at the 
launch of the new extractive project of the mining industry, this situational context is very much at 
the core of the research. Therefore, before heading into the CDA and discussion about my findings, 
the following chapter is dedicated to creating the context around Venezuelan extractivism under 
the post-Chavist era of president Nicolás Maduro’s government.    
 
 
16 See Appendix C for these additional articles. 
17 Appendix B.6, B.7, B.20, B.26, B.27, B.33. 
18 Appendix D. 
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4.5. Limitations of CDA  
 
There are challenges to all types of methodologies and the methods through which the researcher 
establishes understanding of the questions they raise. CDA is not free of these challenges either and 
indeed poses a number of limitations for research. Here, I briefly address some CDA – related 
limitations and challenges related to this study. 
 Firstly, as described above, CDA is based on the study of how actors perceive, describe, 
present and create images of the world through discourse and, therefore, offers little in 
understanding any universal truths or any one set of ideas that form ‘reality’ (Dittmer 2015). This 
world of subjectivity and normative meanings affects the researcher as well, and therefore, a 
continuous self-reflection and distance from the data is needed from the researcher (Wodak 2011, 
40). It is through the framework established above that I offer the reader a way to understand the 
positions that I take in this study. However, as I establish in the consequent chapters, I do approach 
the material and its analysis through that material itself avoiding to making assumptions beyond 
what is introduced in the material of this thesis. 
 Second of all, CDA offers no clear-cut methods for research and thus it is up to the researcher 
to make sense of the appropriate methods for the particular research project (Caballero Mengibar 
2015). This aspect, together with the fact that interpretation of the material for CDA requires an 
ample understanding of the (economic, political, social, ecological…) context in which the discourses 
are (re)produced (ibid. 2015), means that methods can vary much from study to study which 
requires more from the researcher in terms of finding the appropriate methods and explaining these 
choices to the reader (Wodak . 2011, 40, 52). 
 In this chapter, I have presented the way I approach CDA with the aim of addressing the 
limitations and challenges of CDA to outline the position that this study takes.  CDA has its limitations 
but at the same time presents the researcher with tools and possibilities of studying the world of 
meanings. The way in which discourse is connected to the ‘reality’ that people perceive, power 
relations and the situational context is a rich environment for research. The object of this study 
operates in this environment and thus benefits from what CDA has to offer. 
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5. Venezuelan extractivism and the Orinoco Delta 
 
To investigate the research question presented above, I turn to Latin America, where neo-
extractivism is visible through resource rich nations such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile (Gudynas 
2010), and specifically to Venezuela, where some forms of extractivism have existed for decades 
through the abundance of oil reserves  in Venezuelan territory (Teran-Mantovani 2018). However, 
Venezuela is not only interesting because of its oil, but also due to other phenomena. First of all, 
the extremely high dependence on extractivism as revenue for the state and the current economic 
and social crisis that the country is going through (Rosales 2017) makes the country a timely case-
study from the sheer point of view of the claimed dangers of resource exploitation based 
economies. Secondly, to combat this crisis by introducing new commodities, the government has 
initiated a new large scale project to extract minerals that before had been left relatively 
unexploited,  from a vast Venezuelan territory called the Mining Arch of Orinoco (Arco Minero del 
Orinoco) (Teran-Mantovani 2018). As follows, I present why exactly this case is interesting from a 
discourse analysis perspective over new international investors, and with extractivism being put 
forth as an economic development model. 
  
In this chapter, I present the Venezuelan context of natural resource exploitation as well as other 
political and social processes that have led through nationalization of natural resources to the 
current economic model. Additionally, this chapter serves to situate these processes to the 
formation of national imaginaries based on, primarily, oil as development. Furthermore, I introduce 
the specific case of the AMO and its antecedents that have led to the current situation. All of this 
helps to reinforce the analysis of Chapter 5 by contextualizing the question. I begin this chapter by 
mapping out a brief historical overview on Venezuelan extractivism which I present side by side with 
the changes in the political and economic situation, focusing on the history of oil extraction and its 
links to the Chavist-era reforms and the new focus on mining that has become more visible with 
president Maduro. This is followed by an overview of the case of AMO itself by detailing what led to 
the process, what is being done and what the institutional basis for it is. 
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5.1. An extractivist model long in the making 
 
Venezuela has an extensive history of ample hydrocarbon resource extraction that dates to the 
beginning of the last century and goes through several phases of nationalization of these resources 
to reach the current situation of the “Bolivarian revolution” started by Hugo Chávez in 1999 (Teran-
Mantovani 2018). This change in the structure of the country’s economic base and its social fabric 
started with two oil booms,  of 1914 and 1922 (ibid. 2018), that paved the way for a long hundred-
year process of oil becoming a dominant influence in the political and social fields of the petro-State. 
From humble beginnings, the Venezuelan oil industry grew to be a fundamental part of the structure 
of the Venezuelan state at the second half of the 20th century (ibid. 2015). At this time, the vast oil 
resources had become part of an important economic strategy and the state saw to protect the 
resource and make it a fundamental source of revenue through exportation. The founding of the 
Venezuelan Oil Company (CVP) and Venezuela being a founding member of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 both strengthened this position (ibid. 2015).  
Venezuela possesses a huge reserve of petroleum that the country considers to be the 
largest proven reserve in the world (PDVSA 2016). This reserve, since its foundational origins, has 
been continuously and increasingly employed as a source of wealth. Throughout the history of oil 
extraction, the industry has relied on revenues from crude or minimally refined oil and on the 
allocation of this revenue to other activities meant to diversify the economy, a strategy that it has 
largely retained to this day (Péné-Anette et al. 2012). During this period of time, Venezuela has 
undergone diverse models of political leadership and policy positions out of which the current 
‘Bolivarian’ model is the focus of this thesis.  
The crises of the 1980s and 1990s, that included a ‘bust’ in oil commodity prices, saw the 
socialist Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 1999 bringing in a new social and economic project for the 
country which, regardless of the earlier ‘bust’ and very different economic policy message, also 
depended on the revenue from oil (Teran-Mantovani 2018). In fact, the structure of the 
developmental state reliant on oil was strengthened, following a ‘Chavist’ idea of popular 
participation as well as measures to steer economic action to be more socially oriented, following 
the principle of the ‘21st century socialism’ that Chávez proposed as an alternative to capitalism for 
Venezuela (ibid. 2018, Burbach et al. 2013, 49). In this ‘Chavist’ project the government increasingly 
redirected the oil revenues to social programs, establishing a mechanism of rent distribution 
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(Rosales 2016, Corrales and Penfold 2011).  Rent from the petroleum industry formed part of a 
bigger set of reforms of the country’s institutions which were accompanied by a new discourse that 
emphasized anti-imperialist rhetoric, critique of capitalism and an emphasis on the unity of the 
Venezuelan people with Chávez as a central figure of this new project of the nation (Rodner 2016). 
The support for the project was backed by social imaginaries constructed around nationalized oil as 
the way to ‘modernity’ for the country, which was strongly present when the government spoke of 
the oil industry (ibid. 2018).  
During the early years of the presidency of Hugo Chavez, the government did redistribute 
considerable amounts of oil export revenue to social programs, improving in many variables 
including poverty reduction and life expectancy (Teran-Mantovani 2018). The success of this policy 
has partly been given to the momentum given by a global rise in commodity prices that 
characterized the era (ibid. 2018) which coincided with the rise of progressive governments in many 
Latin American countries, like Bolivia and Ecuador, for example (Veltmeyer 2013). In fact, Veltmeyer 
(2013) singles out Venezuela as an example where the new extractivist model actually managed to 
create large-scale rent redistribution that was directed to social programs, unlike in other Latin 
American country where center-left governments rose to power in the early 2000s. The Chávez era 
was characterized by the establishment of the 21st century socialist agenda for Venezuela which 
relied heavily on the personality of Hugo Chávez and his ability to bring much of Venezuela together 
in support of the Chavist agenda (Burbach et al. 2013, 49; 76). During his presidency Venezuela not 
only underwent many reforms that focused on the promise of giving “power to the people”58 but 
the Bolivarian project also faced many challenges related to corruption, domestic production 
deficiencies and political opposition (ibid. 2013, 63; 70-74). Burbach et al. (2013, 76) recognize the 
fundamental role of Chávez in the revolutionary process and managing these challenges up until his 
re-election in 2012.  The following year, Hugo Chávez died of cancer, however, and an increased 
political unrest followed the presidential elections that saw the former vice-president Nicolás 
Maduro elected (Rosales 2016). While Maduro has mostly continued on the same path as Chávez in 
terms of policy and rhetoric (Abi-Hassan 2015), the problems in the electoral process, the aggressive 
governmental response to protests that followed and the economic hardships the country was 
about to face brought upon a new political context for the post-Chavist era (Rosales 2016).  
Following the establishment of a government based on the idea of the ´Bolivarian 
Revolution´, Venezuela experienced a period of economic growth which not only maintained 
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Venezuela in its middle-income rank of countries but also improved in many variables, such as the 
poverty-gap, education and health (Rosales 2016) that would conventionally be linked to the 
‘development or modernization’ of a country. This period of growth was largely attributed to a 
boom in global commodity prices of oil - by then easily Venezuela’s number one export commodity 
– the revenues of which, as earlier stated, were directed towards social programs nationally (Rosales 
2016). At its peak, the international price of Venezuelan oil was at $110,15 per barrel in 2012 
(Angosto-Ferrández 2019). This period of growth, however, was abruptly interrupted in 2015 by 
(another) crash in commodity prices of oil (from the peak in 2012 to a mere $40,73 per barrel in 
2015 (ibid.2019) and which contributed heavily on a situation of a crisis developing within the 
country, not only in the economic sector (ibid. 2016), but in social and political spheres as well. The 
government expenditure to social programs as well as wages saw a large deterioration with oil 
income lowering and inflation increasing (ibid. 2019). Regardless of the fall in prices of 2015, oil 
exports continued to be at the absolute center of foreign currency earnings, constituting a 97% of 
that income in 2015 (ibid. 2019). The stagnation of many economic sectors and the economy in 
general, together with the inability to maintain social expenditure at the pre-crisis levels, led to a 
victory of the opposition parties in the 2015 parliamentary elections which had only happened once 
before (ibid. 2019). This historic moment differs greatly from the height of the oil revenue boom 
that characterized the first years of the Chavist era and thus reflects the changed political and 
economic context of the current AMO project’s inauguration compared to this previous era. 
With the price of oil plummeting and the country falling into a state of crisis, the government 
of president Nicolás Maduro has sought to find new opportunities to boost economic productivity 
and restore the ability of the government to redistribute wealth through social programs. These 
measures include, as one of the fundamental pillars of the diversification of the extractive industry 
and the national economy, the extraction of mineral resources from the rich reserves the nation’s 
soil holds. However, before going further, it is important to explore the historical relationship 
between Venezuelan natural resources and foreign capital. 
5.2. Foreign capital constituting the model 
 
The extractive history of Venezuela has strong linkages to international capital, following the 
aforementioned logic of extractivist investments. However, this history has been a complex one that 
has seen the relation between the state and foreign companies change over time. Nevertheless, 
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one element has remained unchanged: foreign capital in Venezuela continues to maintain its 
fundamental position at the heart of natural resource exploitation strategies.  
The Venezuelan oil industry saw its beginning and formation tightly connected with foreign 
oil companies to whom the still inexperienced Venezuelan national oil exploiting capacity offered 
the territory and the resources underneath it to be extracted (Darwich Osorio 2015). By the half of 
the 20th century, Venezuela had created a multitude of laws that established the first institutional 
changes on the protection of oil as a national asset, and issued regulations to not only harmonize 
the control over oil, that saw its importance growing increasingly, but also to allow for the state to 
have a stronger role in benefiting from the same resource (ibid. 2015). This meant a general tax, 
creating of refineries in Venezuela and ceasing to concede more oil exploitation rights to foreign 
companies (ibid. 2015). Finally, in 1976 this ever-growing regain of control over the industry by the 
Venezuelan state resulted in the direct managing of the said industry (Teran-Mantovani 2018). This 
led to the nationalization of oil and the state gaining direct control over the industry through the 
newly founded state owned company, the PDVSA, which fast became more autonomous and a 
strong actor in Venezuelan politics due to the role oil revenues had in the national economy (Rosales 
2016). However, none of these nationalization steps broke the link between the oil industry and 
international companies, and in  1993, following the measures taken in the “apertura petrolera” – 
re-opening of the industry to foreign investment -  the first nationalization project officially ended, 
bringing with it some very liberal economic policies (Rosales 2016). Furthermore, the ‘apertura’ 
allowed for more aggressive expansion of the extraction of oil by attracting foreign investments 
especially in the Orinoco river belt, to which the PDVSA did not have the resources on its own to 
expand (ibid. 2016). Foreign companies entered the Venezuelan oil fields again, albeit briefly before 
another nationalization process took place. This expansion is important as it established the Orinoco 
oil extraction area that, as will be seen, has influenced the creation of the AMO by establishing a 
precedent for the institutional and structural arrangements, as well as rhetorical power needed for 
the mining project. 
Hugo Chávez’s election and the rise to power of the Chavists in 1999 meant a gradual reversal 
of the policies of the ‘apertura’ in the name of “full oil sovereignty” which was claimed to bring a 
more national, just and redistributive use of the oil revenues following a socialist message of the 
Chavists (Rosales 2016). The major part of the nationalization process was carried out between 2005 
and 2008 when the old contracts of the international oil companies were canceled in the name of 
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“national interests” and replaced with joint-venture companies, established between the PDVSA 
and the interested international oil companies, in which the national entity would retain a 60 per 
cent of the shares while the international partners would have the remaining 40 per cent (PDVSA 
2016). The joint ventures were subjected, therefore, to a larger ability of the state’s control and with 
it to larger financial control, mainly through higher and more concentrated taxation (Rosales 2016). 
The “Orinoco Magna Reserva”-project of the Orinoco oil belt was presented as the flagship project 
of the new oil nationalization through which the PDVSA presented Venezuela as possessing the 
largest crude oil reserves in the world (PDVSA 2016). The clear message of this policy was that 
natural resources had now been employed to the service of the Venezuelan people by redistribution 
to social programs. Foreign companies and capital stayed, though, in the form of the said joint-
ventures. Rosales (2016) describes this pervasive importance of foreign capital as follows: “In order 
to achieve this goal [becoming a “world energy superpower”], it [Venezuelan government] 
recognized the need to attract foreign investments in the form of joint ventures. The importance of 
this shift during the Chavist-era is significant for the analysis in this thesis. Rosales (2018) presents 
Venezuela as having established a “hybrid” policy orientation, when it comes to foreign 
investments, during this time which means policies that opt for change “in the contractual 
arrangements [as in joint ventures] between the state and foreign oil companies” (ibid. 2018, 440) 
but do not shy away from foreign investments, as the system is still dependent on them. In fact, the 
Chávez-era nationalization, very different from strong nationalization debates of the 1970s, has 
focused more on “controlling the resources” with the government centralizing power over natural 
resources while, at the same time, welcoming investments (ibid. 2018).   
After the second nationalization process of the oil industry, 45 joint-venture companies were 
created, with international oil company associates originating from various different countries 
including many European powers, the United States, China, Russia and Brazil among some of the 
more influential countries of origin (PDVSA 2016). Many of these international companies had their 
presence in Venezuela before the creation of joint-venture contracts and thus only renegotiated 
their corporative presence through these contracts, as confirmed by the PDSVA, and as can be seen 
from the date of foundation, that coincides with the years of nationalization  (2005-2007), of many 
of these joint ventures (ibid. 2016). It is to be noted, however, that with Chávez in power, there has 
been a clear strengthening of non-Western alliances which led to a search for diversification of 
markets and the finding new investments (Rosales 2016). This new focus on non-Western alliances 
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has remained during the Maduro era and can be seen in the AMO project’s potential investors and 
in the strong political positioning of promoting multipolarism and strong rhetorical opposition to 
the United States and the economic policies it is seen to represent (Rosales 2016). 
As we have seen, the Venezuelan economy has long been built on the (short and medium term) 
revenue that oil extraction has provided.  The liberal, free resource access-based, ‘old’ extractivist 
tendency has given way to a model of neo-extractivist development, in a process that was largely 
initiated after the popularity of Hugo Chavez’ movement saw Chavez elected president of 
Venezuela. This section briefly sums up the historical context of Venezuela, connecting it to the 
theorization of developmentalist neo-extractivism presented before. In this section, the important 
take is to see how the Chavist government built a political model of the ’21st century socialism’ which 
I intend to link to the neo-extractivist model and present how the 21st century socialist project has 
been built with the support of developmentalist neo-extractivism. Another important factor studied 
here is the legitimization of the anterior neo-extractivist model based on the Petro-State. The 
following section introduces the AMO and how its inauguration during the post-Chavist era is 
strongly linked to the previous oil-dependent model of the Chavist era. 
 
5.3. “New” Orinoco for mining to diversify and “save” the economy 
 
 
In 2016 the Venezuelan government, led by president Nicolás Maduro, signed a decree that would 
open new territories in the Venezuelan Orinoco basin for resource extraction through mining 
activities, creating the ‘National Strategic Development Zone of Orinoco mining belt’ (Zona de 
Desarrollo Estratégico Nacional Arco Minero del Orinoco) (Gaceta Oficial 2016A). This territory holds 
reserves of gold, diamonds, bauxite, iron and coltan (Teran-Mantovani 2018), and covers much of 
the Orinoco river area along with areas in the center of the country covering a total of 
111.843,70kms2 (ibid. 2016). Not only is the area large by its absolute dimensions, but it is  so also 
by relative dimensions of Venezuela19 for which the opening of this territory to mining activities has 
to be seen as a major change in the resource extraction business and a as a threat for socio-
ecological damage. 
 
19 More than 12% of the national territory (Teran-Mantovani 2018) 
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Coinciding with the collapse of oil commodity prices of 2014-2015 and the damage it caused to a 
heavily oil commodity based economy of the country, the opening up of the vast territory for mining 
just a year after the start of the crisis cannot be isolated from the logic of the government searching 
for new opportunities to boost economic productivity and revenues. In fact, the Venezuelan 
president Maduro, in his speech during the act of the signing of the decree, emphasized that 
Venezuela needed to leave behind the oil “rentierism” of old and develop a new strategy for 
economic development (Appendix A). Therefore, the AMO case can be seen as a response by the 
government facing a crisis and hence forms part of the attempt to steer extractivist industries 
towards new sources of revenue to alleviate said crisis. The above-mentioned fall in oil commodity 
prices is part of the societal wide crisis Venezuela has been suffering from. In fact, this fall of oil 
prices had already led to a considerable decrease in social spending and living standards for a large 
part of the population (Angosto-Ferrández 2019). Rosales (2016) confirms that economic problems, 
closely related to resource extraction, have been increasingly observable. Despite the speech of 
Nicolás Maduro that claimed a new form of natural resource exploitation, and in order to break 
away from the old model of oil extraction, there are scholars (for example Teran-Mantovani 2018, 
Rosales 2017) who see the move to mineral exploitation as a new face of extractivism and 
rentierism. This ‘reaction’ of the government forms an important element in the later analysis of 
the case. 
 The government presented its new focus on the potential of the mining industry especially 
through the AMO project and during the same year of its opening the government created a new 
ministry, the Ministry for the Development of Ecological Mining20, to be in charge of the industry, 
separating it from the Ministry of Petroleum under whose authority mining policy previously 
belonged (Gaceta Oficial 2016B). Furthermore, during the same time period, the mining sector was 
set up as one of the “economic motors”21 through which Venezuela is to reform its economy (see 
appendix D). The importance of the new mining reforms is not to be taken lightly, as before, very 
little emphasis had been put on the mining industry in the country before, with often informal 
groups leading the activities – a situation that continues to this day in many areas of the Orinoco 
region (Valladares et al. 2018).  
 
20 El Ministerio del Poder Popular para Desarrollo Minero Ecológico. Literally, the “Ministry of popular power for the 
development of ecological mining”. The Venezuelan ministries are all characterized as “Ministerio del Poder Popular”. 
21 Different sectors that have the uniform goal of diversifying the economy are referred to as engines (motor). This 
characterization of the sectors appears often in the speech (appendix A) and new articles (appendix B). 
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The new emphasis on the mining sector does not necessarily mean that the historically small 
contributions of the mining sector to the GDP or to the distribution of wealth (Valladares et al. 2018) 
can immediately be seen to increase after the 2016 AMO-project – what I want to state with these 
new reforms is the attention and potential of the intensifying of extractive ventures in the AMO 
area that might lead to further escalation of socio-ecological problems and violence related to the 
mining activities that already exist. Therefore, the actions the government has taken indicate a large 
scale and intensive push towards new resource fronts which has, since its inauguration, been 
criticized by scholars, indigenous groups and other civil society movements as causing great socio-
ecological problems that characterize large scale extractivist projects (Teran 2016). Among these 
problems we find the direct contamination and degradation of the Orinoco Delta ecosystem with 
important water sources for the country, the direct and indirect threat to the livelihoods and culture 
of the many indigenous people who inhabit the area, which is now facing massive extractivist 
expansion without any prior viable ecological assessment or consultations with the people of the 
area (Teran 2016).  
Furthermore, the new expansion of extractivist activity, promoted by the AMO, has the potential to 
greatly increase violence and conflicts that have been increasing heavily already before the AMO 
(Teran-Mantovani 2018). The increased demand for mining, and especially gold and its smuggling, 
has increased illegal mining and criminal activity of criminal and paramilitary groups, on one side, 
and the increased militarization of the same areas - including military members working with illegal 
mining actors - on the other side, have concentrated the violence and conflicts ever more to the 
AMO area and thus to regions inhabited by indigenous people (Teran-Mantovani 2018). The capacity 
and willingness of the government, even with the new emphasis on the AMO, to effectively bring 
this process to a halt has been questioned (Ebus 2017). The ecological and social damage these 
megaprojects cause and the activism and mobilizations against them cannot be ignored when 
speaking of these extractivist ventures. The focus of the thesis is on the discourse of the government 
and it is important to keep this socio-ecological damage in mind when we see the discourse of the 
Venezuelan government. 
To organize the new large scale extractivist AMO project, the government has claimed to 
follow the structure of the previously introduced oil industry, especially the Orinoco Oil Belt, 
including the basis for the legislation on resource control and investments as well as providing 
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general context for establishing a large-scale resource extraction area22. Following the structure of 
the oil industry in the country, the structure of economic entities operating in the mining belt are 
legally constituted to be joint-ventures in which the state has the 55% of the shares and profits 
(Angosto-Ferrández 2019). However, Angosto-Ferrández (2019) states that the AMO project does 
indeed enable more operational freedom to international private entities and -capital than the 
neighboring oil project because of the very different contexts that were present at the launch of the 
projects – respectively, one was launched during a both political and economic crisis of the very 
system that initiated the older nationalization projects and the other more than a decade before 
with conditions for nationalization under the government’s plans being much easier both politically 
and economically. According to Teran (2016), the changes in the contracts do in fact cede more 
liberties to the international companies and offer them more flexibility in their operations which 
has effectively weakened the actual policies of “energetic nationalism”, which has been an 
important characteristic in the Bolivarian politics, and given transnational companies resources to 
have an increasingly important role in Venezuelan national political, economic and territorial 
spheres. One example of this are the decrees issued, first in the oil sector and then in the AMO, 
about the “Strategic National Development Zones” and “Special Economic Zones” that give 
increased liberties to international companies, including customs incentives, flexibility for labor 
conditions and tax exemptions (Teran Mantovani 2017), effectively raising questions about 
territorial sovereignty and the power given to TNCs in the Venezuelan national territory.  
 As mentioned above, the mining industry has been proclaimed by government actors as the 
sector that will help Venezuela shake off its dependency on oil and, to this end, the government has 
been looking for international investors to the zone (Rosales 2017), as already seen from the 
opening ceremony of the AMO where representatives of different mining and hydrocarbon 
companies were shown to be strongly present (Appendix A). Interestingly, doubts over the legal 
base for the investments has deterred investors (ibid. 2017) and the ongoing instability of the 
country in the economic and political levels has to be considered when looking into the difficulties 
in acquiring investors and large-scale investments. This tendency, paired with tensions between 
 
22 For example in president Maduro’s speech (Appendix A), he draws similarities between the development of the two 
industries. 
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Venezuela and some actors in Latin America and the Global North23, has the potential to steer 
Venezuela to look for potential investors from countries that can express more support to the 
Maduro led ”socialism of the 21st century” or express less concern for and demand fewer conditions 
on the economic and political decisions made by the government in charge. In this context, we have 
seen the emergence of Russian and Chinese companies partnering up with Venezuelan state owned 
companies to exploit the resources that the Venezuelan territory has to offer, and completely new 
partnerships being made, as is the case of Turco-Venezuelan increased cooperation24.  
All of these phenomena are linked together in the complex field of discursivity, where a 
governmental discourse emphasizes the strength of the new mining industry as the new 
developmental ’motor’, strongly insisting on the benefits of extractivist activity for the country and 
its people, while in the meantime more and more concessions are given to the operations of 
international mining corporations in the country. 
 
5.4. From context to discourse  
 
The oil industry has clearly been a fundamental part of Venezuelan economy during decades and 
had played an important role in building the national imaginary and politics. International 
companies have held their presence in the country through the various cycles of nationalization and 
privatization and keep doing so through the new joint ventures that, according to the Venezuelan 
state representatives and official rhetoric, is a policy that guarantees sovereignty over oil resources 
and its revenue as well as enables this revenue to be redistributed to guarantee the well-being of 
the people of the country.  
At the time of writing, the country is experiencing a major crisis due to the collapse of the prices 
of the very substance that has provided for much of the revenue that maintained the social 
programs operational. The processes and mechanisms introduced in this chapter raise some 
important questions about the Venezuelan oil based economic model that is facing unprecedented 
criticism and opposition. The content of this chapter has to be seen through the notion of neo-
 
23 Venezuela has expressed openly and quite strongly its anti-imperialistic and anti-USA opposition and critique 
(Rosales 2016) and the USA from its part has had very strong critique towards the Maduro regime as well as has 
imposed sanctions. 
24 A rather sudden strengthening of Turco-Venezuelan relations can be seen to have started in 2016 and since then 
Venezuela has become a more important trade partner for Turkey in the mining sector as well, especially through 
exporting gold to Turkey (Karel 2019).  
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extractivism introduced in the previous chapter and through the long-established developmental 
model based on these resources. To summarize this conversation, the intake of this chapter for the 
analysis to follow can be iterated with four considerations: 
 
1) The long history of oil that the Venezuelan state established as almost the sole resource 
brining wealth to the country. 
2) Foreign investments have been present from the outset and, even though the institutional 
relations to them have changed, they continue to form a fundamental component of the 
extractivist model. 
3) The Bolivarian Revolution brought in a new model of development focuses on redistributing 
oil-derived wealth to social programs and criticizing the conventional development and 
economic world order, while continuing to rely on oil revenues as sole the source of wealth 
for the model. 
4) The AMO is an integral part of this process and a response to a crisis in oil revenues falling 
and must, thus, be studied accordingly. This has implications for understanding the 
discursive elements of mining ventures as forming a larger historical narrative of the 
Bolivarian revolution and natural resource policy. 
 
The introduction of new mining ventures is still at its initial stages, however, and the exploitation of 
oil is not going anywhere: the Orinoco Oil Belt contains vast reserves of oil and historically and 
currently has attracted large foreign investments and continues to be a vital part of international 
commercial negotiations and development strategy of the country (Teran-Mantovani 2018). 
Therefore, what is now being constructed in Venezuela is a process that I characterize as a double 
focus on extractivism where oil plays a historically important role and mining is being promoted as 
a newcomer that the government still needs establish as a viable economic alternative to oil 
rentierism and increase its attractiveness to international capital in the forms of investments. This 
double focus is a completely new strategy that threatens to repeat the same pattern of the oil 
industry’s environmentally destructive, rentierist model of production and raises challenges to the 
government in being able to offer a legitimate reasoning behind this new focus.  
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This chapter has provided us with the history and current situation of the Venezuelan extractivist 
ventures, focusing on the context in which the AMO, and the new focus on mining, began appearing 
in the governmental discourse in unprecedent vigor. The four considerations that I present above 
help to guide us through that context and, thus, provide a framework in which the CDA of the 
following chapter is analyzed.  
 
6. Analysis and discussion 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the textual material introduced earlier. I introduce how I applied 
Fairclough’s approach to the texts, conducted a critical discourse analysis based on the approach 
and consequently present the key findings. This chapter consists of a more detailed presentation of 
the texts, including the categorization, context and other relevant factors of the texts and the 
processes behind them that need to be accounted for before the analysis itself. Following this first 
stage, I present the actual CDA conducted in detail, using the three-pronged approach. The 
subchapter is divided in two parts to present the two important larger discursive phenomena that 
arose from the analysis of the texts: the legitimization of the new mining ventures and more subtle, 
yet constant, involvement of international capital, mostly through investors, in discourse. Finally, 
the last part of this chapter ties the two phenomena together, presents the final analysis and 
connects it to a larger context about new extractivist ventures and their links to foreign capital. 
 
6.1. Representations of mining 
 
The first aspect to look at in order to answer the questions about governmental discourse forming 
around new natural resource exploitation projects and foreign capital, presented at the beginning 
of the study is, how the new mining ventures are legitimized in governmental discourse. This aspect 
is a complex and wide one, and in this study, it is investigated using the aforementioned material 
and the CDA. To approach legitimization, I explored and analyzed the material through some key 
features that included focusing on how mining is presented in the material. To understand how 
governmental actors legitimize and justify the new AMO-project, I have decided to look into the 
discursive practices of the said actors to find how they create the legitimizing elements in the 
discourse about mining. Therefore, the representations of mining ventures take the center stage 
here to discover these elements in the discourse itself, followed by an analysis of the discursive 
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findings. The analysis reveals a few aspects that together contribute to the building of discourses 
that can have a legitimizing effect towards the mining industry, which in turn help to understand 
the role of foreign capital in the discourse as well as the underlying ontological positions that I 
address later through developmentalism and natural resource nationalism. These findings are 
divided in three categories which I classify under the following titles (following the findings in the 
analysis): i) mining as modernization and development ii) governmental mining as an answer to 
political criticism, and iii) mining as supporting a wider nationalist project.  
 
i) Mining as modernization and development 
 
The first category consists of presenting mining as a dynamic promotor of development through an 
image of the government-led mining industry as representing an ideal ‘modern’. Not only does this 
category mean that mining is shown as a means to achieve economic growth but it also creates an 
image of mining industry as a modern and dynamic means to achieve overall improvements in all 
sectors and aspects of society – on one side, economical, but on the other side, social as well. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes the role of the government creating a clear gap between its mining 
ventures and other actors in mining. This first category is characterized by developmentalist and 
positivist elements about the capacity of technological advancement in achieving an ideal type of 
’development’. All of this creates a discourse where governmental mining activities are appreciated 
because they represent this normative idea of development that other actors do not – in the 
discourse the governmental mining ventures become a representation of an ideal ’modern’. 
 
a) ‘Dynamic’ and highly technological mining  
 
Firstly, governmental-led mining projects, with the AMO as representative of this, are presented as 
technologically advanced and highly technical. I found this aspect to be a constant characterization 
of the mining industry throughout the material, especially when reflecting the mining industry’s 
traditional problems with environmental destruction. The material referred to mining often with 
phrases such as “ecologically sustainable”, “ecological” and “clean”. This “ecological mining” is 
represented as possible because of “new technologies” and that the national government possesses 
the tools for their implementation. Furthermore, dependency on technological advancement is 
characterized through contrasting it with the known petroleum industry and its problems. To further 
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emphasize the importance of technology in mining, these advancements are often linked to the idea 
that technology furthers “development”, which is seen as a positive concept. 
 Second, I found out that the mining industry itself as well as governmental actors, led 
by the Venezuelan Ministry for Ecological Mining, are attributed a characteristic over all others 
throughout the material. This characteristic I call ’dynamism’, meaning that the industry is described 
as a highly efficient, flexible and active ’promotor of development’ in the country. Dynamism 
supports the characterization of mining as technologically advanced by showing that specifically 
these types of mining ventures function because ’dynamism’ not only means those aforementioned 
aspects but is also understood as normatively positive in the text. The central term of the new 
mining industry that the government uses uniformly is “engine25 ” which captions the idea of 
dynamism and modernization very well. The use of this term, a new one that emerges ever more 
often with the introduction of the AMO and the “integral economic development” plans of the 
government, is wide spread across the publications of the government and often referred to by 
governmental actors who are quoted in these documents. It is used, not only as a term itself to refer 
to the AMO project and the emerging sector but is also often accompanied by other discursive 
means that render mining and the “engine” more dynamic. This includes uses where mining is 
referred to as the “fundamental engine” or a “productive engine” and where this “engine” is told to 
be ’developing’ the entirety of the new national economic goals of the country. Other words with 
significant similar influence are often used with mining. These include “productive” as an adjective 
when referring to mining and mining related economic success and verbs that indicate change 
towards, and the sectors ability to convert into a new “productive model” and into an important 
source for financing other sectors.  
Furthermore, the mining economic motor is presented to be able to generate funds for social 
policy sectors and directly investing into social project funds.  This role of the income from the 
mining sector towards social projects is emphasized, which contributes to showing mining (and not 
only governmental actors in mining but also mining as an activity itself) as socially and ecologically 
aware and with capacity to fast be able to confront changes and contribute to the national economy 
and society as a whole. This is achieved by representing this mining activity through the high capacity 
it has to be exploited for economic gains through being responsive to change, technological 
 
25 AMO and the emerging mining sector are listed as the eight of the (14) engines for economic development that 
President Maduro introduced in the activation speech of the AMO (appendix A). 
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rendering and “the idea of modernity”. This entails a presentation of mining as forming part of an 
“integral” economic model that takes many sectors into account for the “integral development” of 
the country. Governmental actors describe this process as ‘integral’, where “integral” is one of the 
National Plan’s standard terms and is mentioned in the documents and speech constantly and refer 
to being dependent on technological changes and ’development’. At the heart of all of the above 
lies the trust in economy, the economism of developmentalist thought, which we can see from the 
idea that a highly technological sector can bring revenue to the state which will benefit the nation 
and contribute to the overall ‘development’ of other (economic)sectors. 
 
b) Antagonisms to modernity 
 
Additionally, to strengthen the discursive power of the “modernity-based discourse”, some 
antagonistic elements can be seen which follow the logic of othering and defining the discourse 
through exclusion, following Chantal and Mouffe. The two antagonisms identified focus around the 
creation of two very distinct others that both represent ’underdevelopment’ in different ways and, 
thus fortify the mandate of the national mining industry in mining activities.  
The first of the two is the representation of an ’other’ of small-scale mining and miners26 
that are said to practice mining illegally and in harmful ways. This antagonism centers around the 
idea that small-scale miners that are conducting illegal and out of the norm mining activities are 
doing so in ’traditional’ ways and using outdated technology which are represented as un-
sustainable and directly damaging to the surrounding environment, especially through the use of 
mercury in mining, often in areas under governmental conservation. This image of small-scale 
miners is then heavily contrasted with the capacity of the national mining ventures where the 
national mining industry is shown to possess these skills and seen to be able to ”educate” others in 
socially and ecologically conscious mining, in multiple occasions proposing to hand out these 
”technologies for the environment” to the small-scale miners for making their industries part of the 
”integral” national economic model as well. The vice-president of Venezuela is reported calling the 
effects of “illegal mining” an “ecological disaster” (Appendix B.12) and the ecological problems in 
mining areas as the fault of the “interests of smugglers”. The juxtapositions over the ecologically 
 
26 “La pequeña minería” (minería refering to the act of mining, not to any specific actors) is the original term used, 
often in parallel with ”pequeños mineros” or ”mineros artesanales” (small-scale miners/artisanal miners).  
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damaging “illegal mining” and the benefits of the legal, technologically superior, “ecological mining” 
are recurrent in the communications. The material implies that when given these tools of the 
government, the small-scale miners become the protagonists of the AMO project instead of being 
the uncontrolled, illegal and ’underdeveloped’ other that fails to follow these tools and programs.  
The other antagonism that is created is in fact the first of few ways in which foreign influence 
appears in the discourse. This second discursive element of ’othering’ recognizes international 
involvement as harmful, following the earlier policy-orientation of Venezuelan policies of 
nationalizing natural resources. Even though this antagonism is less prevalent in the material than 
the first one and is done in a subtler way, it still achieves a similar effect in strengthening the 
discourse. Here, international mentions are scarce but when they are made they mostly appear in 
news articles that focus on international meetings or bilateral agreements, whereas small-scale 
mining and the ecological aspect are brought up more consistently even throughout articles that 
don’t specifically focus on them. The main discursive action is to imply that foreign involvement in 
resource extraction leads to uncontrolled exploitation of Venezuela’s natural resources. What gives 
this argument power, however, is that it is always joined by a statement that affirms the ability of 
the government, through a set of “very specific and strict” laws27, to control this exploitation to the 
benefit of all parties in a “win-win” situation. The main take here is twofold. Firstly, small-scale 
mining is seen as ’underdeveloped’ directly, and thus could be considered blocking ’development’ 
efforts promoted by governmental actors. And secondly, foreign involvement is seen to ’block 
development’ through its uncontrolled and erratic form of exploitation, that the government can 
keep in check to include foreign capital in the ‘modern’ and controlled form of national exploitation 
that it is practicing and promoting, eventually leading to economically benefit both the state and 
the TNCs involved. Thus, regardless of the very different contexts of the former and the latter, the 
governmentally promoted mining ventures are offered as a solution to both problems. 
 
ii) Governmental mining ventures as an answer to political criticism 
 
The second category consists of the discursive elements that address many of the issues that have 
been attributed to large scale mining. Rather than starting from a critical point of view about the 
destructive potential of mining ventures, it brings in the center of the discourse the way in which 
 
27 Only direct mention, in all the material, to any norms or laws is the ’joint-venture’ legislation that we have seen in 
earlier chapters of the thesis. 
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the government-led mining ventures actually imply positive change in all these traditionally 
negatively associated issues. This category becomes clearer through examples but the main element 
here is to “flip the discourse” by emphasizing the way the AMO can positively impact ecological, 
economic and social questions which would often be seen to suffer due to similar mining ventures. 
In part, this second category complements the first by bringing another emphasis on the way 
discourse is created. In this section, the social, ecological and economic questions are treated and 
introduced separately for clarity and for the fact that the discourse itself separates these core areas 
clearly from each other when they are being spoken about. The issues that governmental mining is 
presented to “fix” are the notion of extractivist activities as a) ecologically destructive, b) socially 
damaging, especially in local contexts, and c) economically unsustainable. Ironically, these 
categories fit well with the general criticism of extractivism that I presented when introducing 
extractivism and the criticism directed towards the AMO. 
  
a) Ecologically destructive mining 
 
The first series of issues are ecologically related. The choice for the ecological questions as the first 
ones comes as no surprise when analyzing the material as it is noticeable how frequent references 
towards the potential of the AMO has towards ecological sustainability and nature preservation 
efforts. Following the discussion above about mining ventures representing a normatively superior 
‘modern’, we see how the discourse characterizes the national mining industry as highly 
technological, which in turn is seen to have a positive impact on the environment. In fact, the 
ecological sphere seems to be one of the dominant emphases of the discourse which I discovered 
after finding out that the majority of ministerial publications and Maduro’s speech (Appendix A) 
mention the novel sustainability capacity of the new mining industry. Furthermore, a significant 
number of the publications (Appendix B) do have ecological issues as the main theme, but what is 
more interesting is that the majority of all the publications, in some way, refer to the ecological 
nature of the mining industry. In fact, the ecologically-oriented approach in the discourse shares 
much similarity with the ‘Green Economy’ or ‘sustainable development’ thinking where earlier 
unsustainable policies are thought to be fixable through moderate policy interventions, modern 
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technology and belief in market mechanisms (Kothari et al. 2014) 28. In the case of Venezuelan 
governmental discourse, especially the insistence on the link between modern technology and 
ecological production methods, can be observed.  
Additionally, words and phrases such as (sustainable, clean gold, ecological mining, 
ecologically produced…) are used and contrasted with ecologically more damaging activities; which 
the above-mentioned small-scale miners and illegal mining activity, especially, represent; and with 
further impactful normative phrases and news-stories, both of which the frequently cited story of 
the country’s first “clean (ecologically sustainable) gold bars” being produced by small-scale miners 
under supervision of governmental actors, represents. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the name of the ministry in charge of the mining industry 
in Venezuela, namely the ’Ministry of popular power for the development of ecological mining’,  , 
was formed with the foundation of the AMO project and forms part of the discourse as well. The 
aforementioned ministry   is one of the few ministries that includes the specific mention “ecological” 
in its name29, and this name in its entirety is more often than not used in the material. The impact 
it has is not to be underestimated – it strengthens the claim of the governmental actors and 
recreates the discourse with an image of ecologically conscious actors. The ministry holds a strong 
position of power and authority by the mere merit of representing an established governmental 
institution. Representing one of the sectors that has seen much critique about its contribution to 
ecological crises, this choice in name does form a part of the making of discourse over governmental 
mining ventures. The ecological insistence and its ties to the new AMO project become even more 
evident considering that the ministry was indeed created in 2016 when the AMO project launched 
and has henceforth been the governmental body associated with the project. 
 
b) Socially damaging mining 
 
The next issue concerns the destructive potential of mining in local contexts in terms of community, 
social issues and exclusion at the offset of an intrusive mining industry, especially in indigenous 
communities, but in other local communities of the region as well. As we have seen in the criticism 
 
28 For example, Kothari et al. (2014) offer a critique towards these views by claiming that they are inadequate in 
dealing with the many socio-environmental problems caused by earlier policies of ‘development’ due to them being 
too closely embedded in the idea of constant economic growth and the neoliberal system. 
29 In fact, out of more than thirty ministries of the country, only the mining sector’s name, besides the specific ministry 
dedicated to “Ecosocialism”, carries the explicit message of being “ecological”. (Gaceta Oficial 2018) 
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to AMO, local people do suffer from the problems of extractivism the most. This destructive 
potential in the local communities sees a ’flip’ in the discourse and instead communal social issues 
are spoken in a positive light through the potential of mining as a unifying and socially contributive 
force. 
 First of all, mining appears as an inclusive and participative activity that considers the entire 
local communities that are affected by the introduction of mining activities in their vicinity, including 
representations that seem to link mining as  even binding the community tighter together. There 
are several different ways that the discourse perpetuates this image. Firstly,  the many pieces of 
governmental communications that focus on reporting the progress of the mining projects by 
focusing on panel meetings (“mesas de trabajo”), meetings between governmental actors from the 
ministry, region and the MINERVEN-state owned mining company, and communities of small-scale 
miners, give an image of participative decision-making over mining policies. Governmental 
publications mention them often when speaking of regional mining plans and communities and they 
are characterized as successful, key parts of the governmental plans on how to develop the AMO. 
Further details of these panel meetings are not clarified, though, leaving out any details of who 
these representatives of the small-scale communities are or whether they indeed are representative 
of all the communities of the regions concerned. The inclusion of indigenous people, in the form of 
indigenous small-scale miners, is mentioned as well, but only shortly when mentioning the panel 
meetings that are being held with indigenous communities. In these occasions it is made clear, 
briefly and concisely, that indigenous people are active participants in deciding for what is seen best 
for the region and the country, giving the understanding that all indigenous people of Venezuela, 
without distinction, support and form a part of the governmental mining plans. These mentions 
include a statement that indigenous (note no specification of a specific community) peoples 
“…recognized the job that the government is doing for their well-being…” (Appendix B.5), which is 
affirmed by the governmental actors by informing that ”mining… …is the only engine that can give 
us, on the short-term, national riches to convert in life, education, healthcare, housing, in social 
infrastructure in protection of parks, in protection of indigenous people” (Appendix B.34), and that 
“indigenous peoples are collaborators in the national development” when it comes to mining 
(Appendix B.12).  
These few mentions aside, the discourse focuses on speaking only of communities and 
people in  general terms, making clear that everyone is considered to be part of the plans and the 
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supposed  ”mining communities” that are shown to represent the ”small-scale miners”. These 
communities (as regulated, governmentally controlled) are represented as the driving source of the 
Orinoco Mining Arch and their contributions and successes are emphasized while large scale mining 
and large joint-venture mining companies are never mentioned in detail apart from news about 
received investments and technological exchange, or as a force to keep in check alongside with 
small-scale miners who do not follow governmental plans, as seen above. An ambiguous concept of 
the ”pueblo minero”, i.e. the ”mining communities”, is shown to be the driving force of the national 
economy and the potential of the people to better their lives with mining activities and the lives of 
all the people. These concepts seem to be used to refer to any communities that practice mining 
activities, mixing different indigenous people with other communities, creating an idea of a united 
people without an understanding of different local contexts. 
 
Examples of ways the material refers to small-scale miners:  
“It’s the organization of the people to produce for the people, but economically 
productive y nowadays ecologically sustainable.” 
(Appendix 
B.12) 
“Small-scale mining, called so for its dimensions and not for its capabilities.” (Appendix 
B.38) 
 
“The potential that we have in small-scale mining could be that it is greater than that 
which we call large-scale mining, if we organize our miners well, […], if we give them 
technical support, […], if we give them technology.” 
(Appendix 
 B. 38) 
 
 
Apart from the togetherness and community creating elements of the discourse, the other 
manner in which these issues are treated focuses on presenting mining activities and governmental 
actors related to mining as exponents of social projects in communities. Here, the focus is at the 
local level, instead of the general funding seen in the first category, and the material shows how the 
discourse focuses on achievements and social projects on that level, and how the wealth generated 
by mining activities will be directed towards investments in projects for the people. In the material, 
several communications directly focus on presenting successful social projects where the ministry 
for ecological mining has been backing them as a “patron”.  These projects are representations of 
local level issues, such as building a school, or grand projects of restoring buildings and building 
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more apartments in communities. The works have little connection to mining activities themselves 
apart from the indication that the ministry of mining has been the patron of the projects. This way 
of presenting mining actors in projects, however, not only strengthens the idea that governmental 
mining actors are present at the local level but also implies that their presence has positive impacts 
on the community in all aspects of social life outside of the mere economic activity of mining itself. 
In fact, in one occasion, the specific article (appendix B.13) describes such a project in a part of 
Caracas as follows: ”These actions and their results constitute a show of the presence of the 
Bolivarian Government and of the president Nicolás Maduro, for the attention of the Venezuelan 
people”.  
 
c) Economically unsustainable mining 
 
The third issue relates to the questions of natural resource dependency and related critiques, as 
well as to the ’rentierist’ economic model, both of which indicate a reliance on a limited number of 
(often raw) natural resources to maintain the economic structure of the country. We saw this earlier 
in the criticism of the Venezuelan mining sector and in the previous policies of the country when 
regarding the dominant oil sector. In this last series of questions, the focus of the discourse is to 
present the new mining industry as a contrary force to the ’traditional’ way in which natural 
resources have been exploited in natural resource dependent economies. 
 Interestingly, the focus of the discourse is to contrast the AMO to the old national petroleum 
industry and policies by acknowledging the problems of the “rentierist” petroleum industry and 
declaring that the mining industry will not commit the same errors. When petroleum is spoken of in 
the data, it is to refer to a natural resource dependent model and is treated as a normatively worse 
model than what the AMO currently represents30. In fact, the data characterizes the emerging 
mining sector as one of the solutions to ”diversify the economy” and to “get over the rentierist 
 
30 It is important to note that there is a linkage between the mining sector and the national development that underlies 
the data: that the developing of the AMO is fundamental for the ”Mining Engine” which, in turn, is representative of the 
”Bolivarian Economic Agenda”. This link is important to know because across all the data, these three (AMO, the whole 
mining sector and the national level economic development plans) are often not specified or are given the same 
attributes and thus treated as being without much independence from one another when related to the element of 
“rentierist economy” where the AMO is understood to be a representation if the whole new national economy. 
 
 
51 
  
model”, two phrases that appear often in the data, alongside with similar juxtapositions between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ models of economic development – for example, president Maduro presents 
AMO as a “source of wealth that diversifies the [state’s] income and substitutes oil [as the only 
source of that income]”(Appendix A). This is insisted throughout the material, reminding that the 
new mining ventures are done in a way that will not lead to resource dependency. While the oil-
dependent economic model is a subject of criticism in the data when speaking of this new project 
of diversifying the economy, the “rentierist model” is offered as something taken for granted, and 
as an a priori alternative that lacks any concrete political or economic context. Thus, the “rentierist 
model” is understood throughout the discourse as an undesirable economic model that is 
referenced clearly as a common part of natural resource dependent economies, including 
Venezuela, but without any admission of having existed under previous Chavist natural resource 
policies that are now being reformed. 
   
 iii) Mining as supporting a wider nationalist project 
 
The last category focuses on how mining is presented as a national project with deep historical roots. 
This series of discursive elements consists of larger phenomena and intertextual elements that 
present mining as a part of Venezuelan national identity and as a common means in achieving 
national goals that are presented as representing the will of all Venezuelans. I identified this process 
mostly as creating imaginaries about mining which consist of bringing up historical processes of 
nationalistic nature.  
 The starting point of this representation of mining is more complex than in the previous two 
representations as discovering it was based much more on elements that do not exist directly in the 
material but rather give strength to the wordings and phrases used: the discursive power that 
intertextuality, imaginaries and many other elements give the discourse. Once more, the category 
overlaps with the others but merits its own categorization due to the specific characteristic as 
’imaginary creating, and imaginary perpetuating’. Two imaginary-creating elements are the focal 
point of this category which I introduce separately for clearer understanding of the elements. 
However, they both contribute to giving the larger discourse of mining the similar positive imaginary 
that characterizes the material studied here. The two categories are as follows: i) mining as a 
national/nationalistic project which is connected to ii) an image of mining as a long historical 
livelihood of many Venezuelan communities. 
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In this representation, mining appears as part of a continuous historical-national project of 
Venezuela, following the principles of the Bolivarian 21st century socialist ideology. Firstly, two 
historical links are made – one sees mining as part of a continuous national project of economic 
development that follows in the footsteps of the Bolivarian Revolution, started by Hugo Chávez. The 
second one emphasizes the long tradition of mining activity by small-scale miners. These both are 
then tied together by elements that emphasize unity and national identity. I start from the latter to 
then connect it to the larger context of the former. 
 Small-scale miners, as we have seen, are referred to throughout the data as the most 
appreciated actors in mining and this premise is applicable to this third representation as well. 
However, here the emphasis is on the historicity of their activities and there are references in the 
data to this tradition of how communities, by mining, are practicing their “ancestral” activities, or 
how they have much to share in terms of knowledge of centuries in mining practices. There is also 
the earlier seen contrast between “illegal” mining, or the ‘non-technological’ small-scale mining that 
works as an antagonism to the ‘modern’ state ventures but even through these mentions, the 
historicity of mining activities is recognized and the acknowledgment of small-scale miners’ long 
traditions in mining activities is appreciated even if their current methods of practice are not.  
 The other historical angle, mining as a continuation of a larger national project, is evident in 
the data across a myriad of occasions. The material contains constant mentions of the “legacy” of 
Hugo Chávez.  This is done by referring to the AMO as a project that was designed by Hugo Chávez 
and then executed according to that design by the president Maduro. The data affirms an 
underlining project, started by Hugo Chávez in the “Bolivarian Socialist Revolution”, and through 
these recurring references to him, keeps making the case that AMO indeed forms an integral part 
of these plans. This representation of a national project of mining is then further emphasized by the 
community creating ways we saw earlier in the second representations and they are emphasized by 
using generalizing terms that create a ’universal Venezuelan people’ – this includes references to 
the “worker” as a general term when speaking of the mining sector’s goals, communities, and who 
the mining ventures are meant to benefit. Furthermore, use of “Patria”, “Bolivarian Government”, 
“Revolutionary Government” and “Bolivarian State”, are normatively strong in meaning and are 
referred to mean an ambiguous ’national unity’ without difference in the meaning between these 
words. Moreover, the national project is strengthened with the creation of antagonisms between 
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this process and both international actors, threatening the sovereignty of Venezuela’s resources  
and the Venezuelan opposition, which is hinted to be against this project in dishonest ways, wanting 
the economy to collapse. Meanwhile, President Maduro is presented as a defender of the Bolivarian 
Revolutionist state from these attacks. 
 The third representation, then, can be summarized as being a representation of the 
governmental mining ventures as a continuation of a national project that takes strength from the 
historical and ideological strength of the Chavez era reforms. The project is a national one where all 
the sectors are brought together:  
 
“We are the popular power, here we come to take this step, with this victory, working hand in hand 
with the ministry, the national and regional governments and with all the facilities giving us 
permanent help” (Appendix B.7) 
 
The national project binds together the claim of mining as a historical profession and livelihood of 
many communities and the AMO, which is offered to guarantee the rights of these mining 
communities. Lastly, the president, Nicolás Maduro, is ultimately seen as the leader of this process 
and of the well-being of the people, and he seen as personally in charge of even the mining ventures 
of the nation. The connection between all levels of the country and the underlying elevation of the 
presidential role in mining is seen in the data through a wide-spread news story that is often 
mentioned in the data, where ’small-scale’ miners are described as personally handing out president 
Maduro the first gold bars produced without the use of mercury (referred to as “clean gold”), and 
followed by commentary about the significance of this for the environment and the national 
‘development’ (Appendix B.8 & B.9). 
 
6.2. Foreign capital in the discourse 
 
In the previous sections I have identified three representations of the governmental mining ventures 
that the data shows. This has been an effort to understand which aspects and elements are present 
and used in the discourse about the new AMO project and the mining sector. I chose to approach 
the mining ventures through the said ’representations’ because together they reveal the elements 
that are used in this discourse to describe these new ventures and, due to the nature of the 
representations showing mining as something to be promoted. Consequently, if international 
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involvement is mostly absent in these representations, it must mean that there is a problem with 
how foreign capital fits with the other elements of the discourse when it comes to creating a 
normatively positive image of mining ventures in the discourse. Indeed, after having identified the 
diverse representations of mining in the data, we can see that the role of foreign capital is small, yet 
some elements related to international involvement are used. In the following section, I summarize 
what we have already learned of the phenomenon from its role in the representations of mining 
and will follow with a brief summary of the other ways foreign capital is present in the data in order 
to understand the full extent and role it has in the whole discourse. 
 First of all, we have seen that the role of foreign capital in the creation of the three 
representations is small, yet complicated. Foreign capital is presented as a threat to the sovereignty 
of the country because of the fear of the loss of control over natural resources and land in which 
these resources are extracted in. Furthermore, the uncontrolled expansion of transnational mining 
companies is presented as a problem for the national Venezuelan project because it is perceived as 
a potentially destructive force for the economy and for its the socio-ecological impact. In both of 
these cases, however, governmental actions towards mining are contrasted with the presented 
‘uncontrollability’ and ’destructiveness’ of foreign capital by presenting that laws and policies 
enacted by the Venezuelan government can control these foreign forces in a way that their 
’controlled’ involvement will bring benefits to the country. Besides the view of foreign capital as  
being a threat that can be contained and contrasted to highlight the achievements of governmental 
mining ventures, the other present aspect of it in the representations is the idea of supporting 
governmental actors in ’developing’ the mining sector to be as technologically ’advanced’ as 
possible. This means showing the Venezuelan government as an equal partner of transnational 
companies and other nations in negotiations about mining investments that are said to focus on 
“technological exchange”.  As we have seen, references to foreign capital in these occasions support 
the representations of governmental mining and are thus part of how mining is presented rather 
than forming part of any separate grand discourse of foreign capital.  
 Whereas the majority of all the data analyzed conforms with the idea of the ’three 
representations of mining’ presented above, there is, however, a stark contrast with the 
publications that have their main focus on foreign capital. Six31 news articles of the ministerial 
 
31 The other publications about foreign investment (appendix C), follow the same discursive tendencies as the six 
(appendix B.6, B.7, B.20, B.26, B.27, B33) that form part of the main data timeline and no significant discursive 
changes are detectable. 
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communications, that constitute the second part of the material for the analysis32, and they do differ 
in tone from the rest of the data. They do still mention the Venezuelan sovereignty and the 
environmental considerations in the abovementioned ways that support the representations. 
However, they raise considerations and topics that are not mentioned in any other parts of the data, 
forming a discussion about foreign involvement, unique to this particular fragment of the data which 
otherwise is very coherent33 in its representations of mining ventures. In this exception of the data, 
foreign capital is presented as mostly investment-related ways that have the effect of showing the 
attractiveness of the AMO for foreign companies. It is described that foreign involvement means 
“strategic alliances”, and “technological exchange”. However, the most evident feature is the 
insistence that Venezuela is a good place for investing and for forming these “strategic alliances”. 
The potential of the AMO is presented, with a list of resources the area contains, especially focusing 
on gold and diamond reserves, emphasizing the size of them and focusing on processes that make 
it easier for Venezuela to export these resources, and these publications repeatedly mention how 
Venezuela is welcoming towards foreign investments. Furthermore, these exception-creating 
publications center around the negotiations and meetings the Venezuelan government has had with 
foreign companies and representatives of the government of the nations these companies originate 
from, with regard to preparations for exploration of the mineral resources in the AMO area, as well 
as participation of governmental actors in mining conventions, with the focus on an exchange of 
experiences and technology-sharing between state actors and foreign companies.  
 
 
6.3. Discourse and resource nationalism 
 
Finally, we come to the questions that were established at the beginning of this thesis. The 
representations of mining that I proposed in the previous section are but a tool for the CDA. They 
serve to categorize observations, discursive moments and the articulation practices that lead to 
them, and as follows, I present the analysis and findings, using the abovementioned representations 
and other tools of the CDA presented previously.  
 
32 Page 24 indicates the material of the analysis. 
33 ’Coherent’ in that it repeats the same discursive elements and refers to the same topics throughout the data. For 
example, a publication about the achievements of small-scale mining does not fail to mention ecological impacts, the 
role of all levels of government and the technological advances of the government. These same aspects are present in 
the publications about foreign investments as well, yet foreign investments, as presented in their own publications, 
are not part of any other publication of a different topic. 
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Natural resource nationalism with a new twist 
 
The representations that we see in the discourse follow some common lines through which it is 
possible to analyze what kind of a discourse the governmental actors follow when speaking of 
mining ventures. We see that these representations all have elements that emphasize the capacities 
of the state in providing ‘development’ and claiming to represent a wide range of communities, with 
different social contexts and needs, that are bound together in the idea of the ’Bolivarian national 
development’. These elements bare much resemblance to how Pellegrini (2016) as well as Kohl and 
Farthing (2012) have analyzed the popular imaginaries and discourse about extractivist industries in 
Bolivia. From their description of the Bolivian situation, we find out the definition of resource 
nationalism as a set of discursive practices that define natural resources and activities related to 
them as a ”general interest” of the nation which is protected by a “legitimate national government 
that uses the revenues generated by extractive activities to finance social policies and public 
infrastructure” (Pellegrini 2016, 200). This contains strong discursive elements of denouncing 
foreign interests that are seen to exploit national areas for their own benefit, and, for a successful 
discourse, takes strength from the deep-rooted history of colonial exploitation (Kohl and Farthing 
2012, Pellegrini 2018). In the three representations we see how resource nationalism appears in the 
Venezuelan governmental discourse as well. In the first representation, we see how the government 
builds, through antagonistic discursive practices and ’dynamic’ portrayal of national mining, a 
mining sector that appears as superior to other options and a state that through laws and 
institutions establishes itself to be the defender of that sector from outside ‘others’.  In the second 
representation, we see discursive elements that assure the capabilities of governmental actors in 
guaranteeing the well-being of “the people” and reassurances that the governmental-led mining 
can indeed ‘cure’ the problems of extractivism. In the third representation, we see the creation of 
a national imaginary that is based in the Bolivarian revolution and the legacy of Hugo Chávez, and 
how closely the natural resource-based model of production is linked to this history. 
 This ‘natural resource nationalism–leaning’ discourse does not originate in the opening of 
the AMO in 2016, however, and we must investigate a longer process to understand the discursive 
practices when it comes to mining ventures. As established earlier, Venezuelan history is tightly 
linked to the relation between the state and Venezuelan oil resources. When analyzing the discourse 
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on mining ventures, we have to look into the historical context of Venezuela, especially through 
petroleum and the Bolivarian revolution, started by Chávez. What we need to establish about the 
Chavist era is the importance that the political rhetoric of Chávez had in creating a completely new 
hegemonic discourse in Venezuela that is characterized as being “an anti-status-quo mode of 
governance keen on replacing all political institutions associated with the old establishment, the 
presentation of his person as the central figure of a new inclusive nation-project, and a strong 
emphasis on turning the country into a participatory democracy” (Abi Hassan 2015, 30). This was 
achieved in part by legitimizing the discourse through linking it in history, and establishing an anti-
imperialist, post-colonialist understanding of Venezuelan history (Rodner 2016). As seen earlier, this 
nation project was tightly linked to the imaginaries of nationalized oil and the idea of modernity 
through oil. As Abi-Hassan (2015) asserts, this Chavist populism has continued to the Maduro era, 
and the discourse established by Chávez has shown to have a hegemonic-enough of a position to 
endure even in the ’post-Chavist’ era with the Maduro led government. 
 The resource nationalist discourse on mining ventures faces a unique challenge, however, 
that the Chavist era discourse on petroleum did not. The situation is different, not only because 
Chávez is gone and there is skepticism about the rhetorical skills of Maduro (Rodner 2016), but also 
because of the economic and political crisis that the government has had to deal with. Furthermore, 
the mining industry does not have a strong institutional role rooted in history, unlike the oil sector, 
which it had already before the Bolivarian revolution. To face all of this uncertainty, I found that the 
representations repeat and emphasize the building of national unity, and attempt to base mining 
activities in the same continuum of the Bolivarian revolution, thus continuing with the same 
discursive practices of before, highlighting the role of president Maduro as a follower of Chávez and 
his policies. Furthermore, we see other elements in the discourse that bring validity to the claim 
that the new mining ventures indeed have the capacity of being productive for the national 
economy. Apart from the features of natural resource nationalism, as is promising social welfare 
through resource revenue, the mining industry is linked to a whole set of economic reforms as part 
of ’integral development’ and as highly technological industry. In the same way, the old problems 
of petroleum based, resource rentierist economy, are told to have been fixed in the new economic 
model. However, to maintain the connection and discursive power of the Chavist era, the petroleum 
industry that is being criticized is turned into an ahistorical concept, rather than a reality in 
Venezuela’s Chavist history. These discursive elements bring with them a developmentalist, through 
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the aforementioned idea of modernization and economism, and the positivist34 view, that places 
economic development and a belief in the capabilities of technology in solving problems in an 
extractivist industry as part of a discourse. The AMO becomes a manifestation of the ‘modern’ that 
is believed to ‘develop’ the country through economy with the help of a belief in the idea of progress 
that can cure the problems of earlier production methods by ‘modernizing’. Seeing that mining does 
not have a strong historical context in Venezuela, from which to draw more legitimizing power, this 
feature appears much throughout the data and blends into the resource nationalist discourse by 
showing the capability of the Bolivarian state to reform its economic base, while also emphasizing 
the grand opportunities and skill that is seen to define the AMO project, envisioned by Hugo Chávez 
for “the people”. 
 
6.4. Why is foreign capital so conflictive? 
 
As we have seen, the discourse follows closely the logic of a natural resource nationalism based 
discursive practices. To fit foreign capital into such a discourse is not an easy task and, as we have 
seen, it is done so in the data by presenting the government protecting the sovereignty of Venezuela 
from its influence. In fact, we see a common problem with countries that employ a resource 
nationalist discourse when it comes to the need of foreign capital – as Kohl and Farthing (2012, 231) 
frame it in the case of Morales’ Bolivia, “this [need for foreign capital] puts a left-wing, anti-
imperialist government in the awkward position of relying economically on the very foreign firms it 
often publicly attacks”.  Furthermore, Rosales’ (2018) characterization of Venezuela’s oil resource 
policy as “hybrid resource nationalism” does indicate similar patterns of a problematic relationship 
between the resources of a state and the dependence on foreign investments. Rosales shows that 
this hybrid model welcomes investments in an unprecedented way, comparing to previous views of 
leftist politics, but the centralization of decision making, the control of resources, rather than full 
ownership, and maximizing rents for the Bolivarian model of redistribution of wealth are enough to 
create an equilibrium between the socialist project and foreign investments (Rosales 2018). In my 
analysis, however, the data shows a stronger evasion of foreign capital related topics than the 
‘hybrid model’ would perhaps allow – as we have seen, the data minimizes the role of foreign 
 
34  In fact, Lander (2013) observes that the overall governmental discourse had shifted increasingly towards a 
“developmentalist and extractivist tone” already in 2013. Seeing the discourse presented here, we can see that this 
tendency is continuing and visible in the discourse regarding the new mining ventures. 
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investments while commending the importance of small-scale mining. This can be partly due to the 
need to convince that the Chavist era focus on opting for locally productive units and collective 
property is still a viable scheme in the AMO, regardless of the real change towards favoring direct 
state involvement and cooperation with larger private producers that has happened in many sectors 
due to the economic and political changes during the post-Chavist era (Angosto-Ferrández 2019) - 
changes that concede more power to foreign capital and could put into question the discourse of 
resource nationalism. Nevertheless, at the level of discourse, we see a problem as all the 
aforementioned characteristics require the assumption that investments are only a ’necessary evil’ 
rather than a morally acceptable opportunity by themselves. My findings in the data do support this 
and the discourse does fall under a stronger emphasis of resource nationalism than practice.  
This inherent necessity of foreign capital is shown in fragments of the data that are separate 
from the discursive style of the rest of the data, which does fall under the resource nationalist 
discourse. Enthusiasm towards foreign investments does not fit in the discourse but for the AMO 
project a steady flow of foreign investments is considered necessary for the megaproject, as we 
have seen both through the extractivist framework and through the (limited) expressions by 
Venezuelan governmental actors. The government is showing to have an open mind towards 
investments by including language in the general discourse that is more favorable towards foreign 
investments and which keeps reminding that the AMO is indeed a viable option for those 
investments. The data that diverts from the resource nationalist discourse does speak this language 
more than any other piece of data, which is also visible in the inauguration speech of Maduro, with 
mostly representatives of foreign companies present, which directs its attention much more 
towards investment opportunities, achievements in making Venezuela a good place to invest and 
offers a public display of signing agreements between foreign companies and the Venezuelan 
government. Angosto-Ferrández (2019) confirms that the Venezuelan government has indeed 
needed to provide reassurance for foreign companies to invest in the AMO, and that a “multilateral 
pragmatic approach” of searching for investments and international trade deals has characterized 
the Bolivarian governments. Therefore, this exception in the otherwise nationalist discourse does 
reveal the necessity of foreign capital, one that Venezuela has not been able to surpass, and shows 
a conflict in the discourse is elevated by the AMO project because of the need for steady flow of 
investments needed to begin large-scale mining projects in the area which is still at its initial steps 
of its promise of becoming a credible alternative source for revenue to challenge the oil sector. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this study has been to examine the links of foreign capital in large-scale extraction 
projects and my focus has been on the case of the Venezuelan new Orinoco Mining Arch project. In 
this thesis, I have investigated these links through analyzing governmental discourse, with the 
notions of extractivism and developmentalism providing the theoretical framework and Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) offering the methodological basis for the study. 
 In this thesis I have given an overview of the Venezuelan context of extraction and how the 
oil-based extractive model has dominated the country’s economic (and social) policies and how this 
extractive industry has been established as part of Venezuela’s Bolivarian national imaginary. The 
new AMO project has brought forward an unprecedented interest in the mining industry and thus 
made the study of a mining-centered discourse all the more timely and important. Framing the study 
using the concept of extractivism, I investigated this discourse and the role that foreign capital, 
fundamentally linked to many extractivist mega-projects, plays in this new extractivist turn that 
Venezuela is currently experiencing through its mining ventures. 
This thesis set out to answer the over-arching research question: what kind of a 
governmental discourse is established around new natural resource exploitation (mega)projects, 
and how does this discourse address the role of foreign capital? This question has been approached 
in this study by leaning on the rich tradition of CDA. Using methods that support the CDA approach, 
I first uncovered three representations of mining that were present in the governmental discourse, 
and then compared these to the ways foreign capital is involved in the discourse. The findings 
indicate that attempts to legitimize governmental mining ventures are carried through by building 
a public image of an ecologically sustainable, dynamic and sovereign mining industry that is deeply 
linked to the Chavist-nationalist imaginary, and intertwined with more subtle elements, including 
foreign capital, in the discourse. 
 
In this thesis we have seen the persistence of the resource nationalist discourse of the post-
Chavist Maduro-led government even in the recent aspirations to create a large-scale mining 
industry in Venezuela. We have seen how foreign capital is tightly linked to this discourse, 
accentuating nationalist tendencies, and at the same time being ’the exception’ to the discourse 
that confirms the existence of a foreign investment-dependent system in conflict with itself, most 
of all on the discursive level. Through discourse, we understand the perceived ‘reality’ through the 
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narratives that the governmental discourse creates. Through this discursive approach, we have seen 
how the Venezuelan resource nationalism has power in creating a hegemonic discourse that reflects 
on other, older, narratives of ‘development’. What I have found through analyzing the data is that 
this resource nationalist discourse, its origin and its features are currently reproducing a 
developmentalist based neo-extractivist narrative which praises (economic) ’development’, 
considers resource extraction as necessary, and follows a neoliberal logic of accumulation of capital.  
While the Venezuelan government might insist on national sovereignty alongside ecological 
and socialist principles, the narrative that the discourse presents behind these affirmations is one 
that supports the same principles of progress as the system itself criticizes: a belief in an 
economically fueled development that benefits from the exploitation and destruction of much of 
the socio-ecologic order. This we can understand from a few key ’reality-building’ elements of the 
discourse. Firstly, the insistence that ’development’ and well-being of the people can be achieved 
mostly through the ’development’ of productive, high-revenue sectors and the belief in the progress 
of technology, that the government claims to have achieved for the AMO, can fix large structural 
problems of extractivist sectors. Secondly, creating an image of foreign capital as ’necessary evil’ 
does, in fact, legitimate the involvement of TNCs in the Venezuelan mining ventures, which creates 
the conditions of accepting them as an integral part of the system. And thirdly, the strong discursive 
claim that an extractivist sector can be the savior of an economic system that was previously based 
on another extractivist sector strengthens the notion that extractivism is indeed an integral part of 
the ’narrative of development’.  
Thus, looking at the questions presented at the beginning of this thesis, foreign capital does 
fit in the discourse because, despite of its apparent potential for conflict, it is part of the narrative 
that the governmental discourse creates. At the same time, however, the problems of delivering 
the populist promises of the same discourse to the Venezuelan people  – ecological sustainability, 
economic growth, jobs and general welfare, and sovereignty – under the neo-developmentalist and 
neo-extractivist narrative of the current crisis have the potential of seriously challenging the 
discourse and, thus, that ’reality’ which it presents. The processes that are challenging this 
hegemonic discourse in Venezuela at this moment in history are a topic that deserve further 
investigation. 
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The relevance of this thesis is not only for the case of Venezuela. Rather, as we have seen, 
extractive activity and its conflictive potential is ubiquitous. The Venezuelan case shows that 
extractivist activities are being reimagined and included in ‘development’ plans of many resource-
rich nations, sometimes replacing other extractivist industries, sometimes complementing them. 
What arises is the question concerning how governments might continue to ‘sell’ extractivism? This 
becomes especially relevant in cases like Venezuela, but similarly in Bolivia and Ecuador, where a 
strong opposition to the capitalistic economic model prevails, but extractivism endures, in state 
policy. The pervasiveness of developmentalist ontologies serve to understand these questions 
better. The discursive notion of  ‘development’, bound to the developmentalist  logic of economic 
primacy and the pursue for modernity, appears in many forms in different political contexts and, 
despite the differences in the political orientation of governments, we can find similarities in the 
ontological positions of the actors through the idea of developmentalism. Development might be a 
notion that holds little value outside discourse, but its manifestation as neo-extractivism has an 
immense potential for destruction in the socio-ecological context.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: The speech data 
 
Here I present the speech of Nicolás Maduro Moros, President of Venezuela held at the central bank of 
Venezuela February 24th ,2016.  The speech was retrieved from Youtube: 
- Bracci Roa, L. 2016. Presidente Maduro activa el Arco Minero del Orinoco e instala Motor Minería. 
[online video file] retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gj1XighWg4k (accessed 
18.09.2019). 
The speech forms a part of a larger event to activate the Orinoco Mining Arch – project by introducing 
the Arch and signing some preliminary contracts between the state of Venezuela and investors from 
different TNCs. The event was televised and there were investors from transnational companies present, 
for whom the event was mostly directed. Also, in the audience, on further rows, some “small-scale 
miners” were indicated to sit in the audience and a few times the attention was drawn upon them. 
The event contained other speeches and discourses by government officials, but the largest part was 
given to Maduro who spoke during most of the event. The speech transcribed here is that of Nicolás 
Maduro, without containing the rest of the speeches by other governmental actors. 
 
 
Speech as transcribed: 
De activación del motor minero de la agenda economía bolivariana. A todos los trabajadores y trabajadoras 
del banco central de Venezuela, un abrazo fraterno, solidario a cada uno de ustedes (applause). 
 
Ya veníamos, en la puerta del banco central, conversando con los trabajadores siempre, y les decía a los 
compañeros: siempre hay que estar en contacto directo con trabajadores. Saber de su opinión, sus 
expectativas, sus formas de vida. Saber la pertinencia y el impacto real de lo que hacemos. Todos los días 
en las distintas formas. No podemos construir liderazgo a aéreos, repúblicas aéreas… Tenemos que 
construir liderazgo en repúblicas… reales que caminen con los pies que trabajan, que piensen con la cabeza 
de los que sienten la patria. Y que tengan la capacidad de sentir, a profundidad, el amor que nos mueve 
como país. 
 
Hoy es un acto muy importante como ha dicho el presidente del banco central de Venezuela, matemático 
Nelson Merentes. Y el ministro de petróleo y minería, querido compañero Eulogio del Pino. Es un día 
magnifico en el marco de la agenda económica bolivariana. Quiero agradecer, de manera muy especial, a 
todos los inversionistas, a todas las empresas de 35 países. Decimos nosotros, no sé si tiene traducción, que 
vengan… lo que voy a decir no se si tiene traducción, que vengan 150 empresas... las más importantes del 
mundo en el campo de minería de 35 países, atendiendo la invitación. Dispuestos a trabajar, decimos en 
Venezuela: no es concha de ajo, no es cualquier cosa. Gracias por estar con nosotros, es una demostración 
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de fe… de confianza en Venezuela. Esto no surge de ayer para hoy. Se viene trabajando. Primer lugar, esta 
magnífica gráfica, fotografía, de cuando el comandante Hugo Chávez, por allá enfrentando hace tres años 
una lucha, un duelo contra una enfermedad que le atacó tan joven, 59, 58, años. En pleno esplendor de su 
liderazgo, creador, creativo magnífico. Lo recordamos perfectamente cuando estábamos 
 
trabajando toda la estrategia internacional inversionista, investigación, año 2011, 2012, y como unir el 
proyecto de la faja petrolífera del Orinoco, todo el proceso del desarrollo integral de la faja petrolífera del 
Orinoco, con lo que el definió el Arco minero del Orinoco. Abajo del rio Orinoco. Al sur del rio Orinoco, nos 
ha llevado tiempo organizar las investigaciones científicas con apoyo de tecnología de diversos países del 
mundo, de Rusia, de China, de República Islámica de Irán, de Cuba, de Canadá. Entre los que recuerdo en 
este momento… ¿Ha? (someone says more) de Sudáfrica, Angola, Brasil, y bueno, los científicos los 
técnicos, los profesionales de nuestra patria venezolana. Organizar el concepto del arco minero del 
Orinoco. 
Y utilizando la metodología de planificación de los bloques de la faja petrolífera hemos venido 
definiendo con mucha claridad todo el marco organizativo de lo que van ser las áreas y los bloques de 
inversión para el desarrollo del arco minero del Orinoco. Venezuela oscila hoy con unas reservas probadas 
entre 364.000 toneladas de oro por ejemplo. Las últimas investigaciones nos dan, solamente en la zona 
oriental del arco minero, la potencialidad de 4.300 toneladas en el campo de oro nada más. Y con la firma 
del documento donde iniciamos la certificación internacional oficial del arco minero del Orinoco dicen las 
proyecciones de los expertos que Venezuela pudiera colocarse por encima de las 7.000 toneladas con la 
segunda reserva de oro del planeta tierra. Hoy por hoy (applause). 
Estos son datos de mucha importancia. Porque, además, vamos trabajando… nosotros tenemos un 
proyecto de país, el plan de la patria… tenemos un plan… la agenda económica bolivariana para enfrentar, 
bueno, el desarrollo del país en cara de la emergencia que estamos viviendo. Como producto, ustedes 
saben de la caída de los precios del petróleo. Hoy el petróleo otra vez llegó a 24… hmm… es imposible que 
se mantengan estos precios y no se quiebre todo de la industria petrolera del mundo… en sectores más 
poderosas como la venezolana. Que estamos en imposibilidad de seguir produciendo así… esperando 
mejores tiempos. Tenemos un proyecto de país. Tenemos un plan… pero vamos más allá. Hmm? Ya 
tenemos los planes específicos. Tenemos ya la proyección del arco minero, en este caso. Del motor minero. 
Tenemos la experiencia, tenemos las alianzas nacionales y tenemos las alianzas internacionales. 
Lo tenemos todo para activar este gran motor con los actores fundamentales, inversionistas 
nacionales, los más importantes inversionistas del mundo de 35 países, más de 150 empresas. Con nuestra 
minería artesanal pequeña y mediana con una gran experiencia. A la cual estamos dando, y les vamos a dar 
un trato especial. Y con una visión clara del desarrollo minero a partir de los conceptos del ecosocialismo. 
Del respeto absoluto a la biodiversidad, a la ecología, al ambiente, al ser humano. El desarrollo de la 
minería en función del ser humano. No, al desarrollo de la minería en función de destruir el hábitat y 
explotar al ser humano. Tenemos los conceptos muy claros basados en el humanismo bolivariano… En 
nuestro máximo orgullo, invitados internacionales, Bolivar…hmm? Y el humanismo que se prende de allí. 
Bolivar, todo es libertad. Bolivar todo es humanidad. Y lo que nos mueve a nosotros, el pueblo, desde el 
punto de vista espiritual humano: lo grande, aspiramos a lo grande. Y para nosotros lo grande es el ser 
humano… Generar riqueza para desarrollar al ser humano y la sociedad, sobre todo en tiempos de 
dificultad. Como en las que vive Venezuela… En las que viven los países petroleros y en las que vive, en 
general, la economía mundial. 
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Ahora, este arco minero, como ha explicado muy bien nuestro ministro, tiene inmensas potencialidades 
que están ya en… están en pleno desarrollo…hmm. No solamente el oro… está un material estratégico, el 
coltán… Hmm... está todo el desarrollo del diamante en Venezuela… con las debidas certificaciones… 
internacionales. Ya está el desarrollo avanzado del hierro venezolano… de la bauxita, del aluminio ¿hmm? Y 
del cobre asociado a todas estas minas. ¿Hmmm? 
El concepto es hacer una explotación respetuosa del ambiente, del ser humano… y hacer un 
proceso de desarrollo industrial en Venezuela. De industrialización del oro, del cobre, del diamante… 
Avanzar en nuevos conceptos de desarrollo, combinando la gran inversión, la gran tecnología… 
combinándolos con los saberes sectoriales y el desarrollo cultural diverso de los mineros artesanales, que 
en Venezuela, bueno, son centenarios en su conocimiento y en sus capacidades de trabajo. Así que está 
todo dado para que iniciemos una alianza… una asociación ganar-ganar, como decimos. Nuevas fuentes de 
riqueza para Venezuela. 
El marco jurídico está establecido. Es muy claro… Es muy claro. Y en su columna vertebral está el 
que nuestro país se desarrolle, aguas abajo, en la capacidad de generar nuevas fuentes de riqueza… de 
corto, mediano y largo plazo. Sin lugar a duda, la minería es una de las fuentes más inmediatas donde el 
país puede equilibrar sus ingresos sus cuentas para mantener el ritmo del desarrollo social, de construcción 
de igualdad y de la felicidad social… y de estabilización en general de nuestra sociedad. Es la minería uno de 
los elementos que tenemos, digamos… con la mejor planificación y proyección y que nos permite, hoy, 
echar a andar este motor minero con mucha fuerza… quizás uno de los motores que esta arrancando con la 
mayor fuerza de los 14 motores que hemos planificado de la agenda económica bolivariana, con las que 
estamos construyendo el futuro encarando la tormenta y creando condiciones para una economía nueva 
(applause). 
Una economía potencia, una economía potencia. Que inversionistas de continente americano, 
bienvenidos. De Canadá hasta la Patagonia, bienvenidos de la Asia, África, Europa y mas allá. Bienvenidos 
todos. Estamos ya preparados y en condiciones de avanzar, de manera inmediata, el desarrollo de este 
motor minero… que, como decía, es una de las fuentes de riqueza de nuestro país hmm.  además, qué 
ustedes como socios de Venezuela sepan que en Venezuela se está construyendo un omo de lo social. Si no 
fuera por el modelo social que hoy tenemos hubiera sido imposible soportar la baja de los ingresos de 97% 
en divisas convertibles que ha tenido Venezuela en el último año . Hubiera sido imposible soportar las 
inversiones para sostener el empleo que en Venezuela, como ustedes saben, es uno de los objetos de 
mayor cuidado del gobierno y del estado. El empleo de calidad, el empleo productivo. Para sostener el 
ingreso nacional… el ingreso de los trabajadores… el ingreso de la clase media. Para sostener la educación 
pública gratuita de calidad, es una inversión gigantesca. Hmm? 
Estábamos revisando, con el informe, extraordinario que dio el vicepresidente de la República, 
profesor Aristóbulo Istúriz Almeida, ante la asamblea nacional, ayer. Lo felicito públicamente, un 
extraordinario informe. Estamos analizando (applause)datos, no?... de la década de los 90. Datos de estos 
años de revolución. Y como eso ha impactado en los niveles de vida por ejemplo en la educación… en la 
década de los 90 de cada diez niños solo cinco  iban a la escuela primaria. Hoy van nueve. En la década de 
los 90 de cada diez jóvenes solo iban cuatro a la educación secundaria de los liceos, hoy van ocho… La meta 
es subir, y subir. Pero dond... donde más impresionante es nivel universitario que es el futuro de los 
países… conocimiento científico de mayor nivel. En la década de los 90 de cada diez  jóvenes, entre 18 y 30 
años , iban a la universidad dos. Hoy van nueve… a la universidad. Sin contar con lo que llamamos en 
Venezuela las misiones sociales educativas, donde se incorporan otro gran contingente de venezolanos… 
venezolanas, ya en edad adulta estudiar su primaria, secundaria, carrera universitaria, carreras técnicas. 
 
72 
  
¿Como se sostiene esto?... si ha caído el ingreso nacional por fuentes de riqueza petrolera el 97 por 
ciento? Se sostiene porque hay un sistema de capta… de creación de riqueza nacional… de captación de la 
riqueza nacional y de distribución justa (emphasizing) de la riqueza nacional. Esto lo digo para ustedes, no, 
como parte del conocimiento de… al país que llegan sus inversiones. Es un país que está construyendo otra 
vez, de la justicia social de la igualdad social, la felicidad de un pueblo para sostener el desarrollo 
económico. Para sostener la creación de la riqueza real. Y el motor minero. Y específicamente el arco 
minero del Orinoco es una de las fuentes más magníficas y extraordinarias que hoy tiene Venezuela y que 
hoy activo como fuente de riqueza (aplausos) que vaya equilibrando los ingresos… Los vaya diversificando y 
vaya sustituyendo el petróleo como única fuente de riqueza y divisa internacional. 
14 motores de creación de riqueza nacional… Y para que creamos riqueza? Para la felicidad social. 
Es nuestro concepto. Somos socialistas por eso. Socialistas del siglo 21, pues. Y ojalá socialistas del siglo 22. 
Lo que vamos a vamos a construir es el largo camino superando dificultades y atravesando el desierto… las 
veces que nos toque atravesar el desierto como en esta oportunidad. Así que, bueno, yo quiero que 
procedamos. Quiero proceder inmediatamente, dentro de esta línea de acción a tomar la primera decisión 
y afirmar, de manera inmediata, la activación… el inicio… en este acto histórico, que tiene el impacto que 
tuvo el acto donde el comandante Hugo Chávez aprobó la certificación de las reservas petrolíferas de la faja 
del Orinoco. 
Alguna gente siempre de manera ligera e irresponsable. O a veces mezquina y egoísta o envidiosa... 
hay gente envidiosa en la vida, verdad? Algunas ideologías promueven mucho la envidia, la mezquindad y 
egoísmo… Cuando el comandante Chávez dio el paso de certificar las reservas petroleras se burlaron. 
Porque decían que eso era casi carbón y el comandante Chávez dijo, no, vamos a certificarlo y Venezuela va 
a tener ahí su reserva petrolera en función de un desarrollo integral de recursos petroleros. Y así se hizo… y 
hoy por hoy Venezuela es reconocida en el mundo … certificado internacionalmente por tener la mayor 
reserva petrolera de este planeta, y tener un marco jurídico de inversiones muy exitoso donde participan 
también más de 40 firmas internacionales junto a nuestra empresa PDVSA. Lo mismo, con la misma carga 
histórica, yo en este momento, voy a firmar el decreto para que se proceda inmediatamente a la 
cuantificación… la cuantificación… y la certificación de las reservas mineras contenidas en el arco minero 
del Orinoco, de manera inmediata. Así que firmo este decreto (Maduro signs a document amid applause) 
para que se proceda inmediatamente hacer la certificación. 
Y los venezolanos tengamos. Y los venezolanos tengamos una base más sólida aún, para las 
asociaciones, las inversiones, el desarrollo de este arco minero. Y podamos hablarle al mundo con mayor 
propiedad sobre los proyectos y las reservas, en oro, en diamantes, en cobre, etcétera etcétera.. Así que, 
bueno, procédanse, de manera inmediata. Ya las contrataciones están hechas. Hoy vamos a firmar un 
conjunto de contratos para proceder a la certificación de tres áreas del arco minero del Orinoco. Así que yo 
pido por favor al ministro Eulogio del Pino ¿no? Y al equipo del protocolo… que procedan de inmediato a la 
firma de los memorándum de entendimiento con las empresas internacionales, que desde ya se incorporan 
a los procesos de certificación de las áreas del arco minero del Orinoco y desde ya se incorporan con su 
inversión para producir en Venezuela en asociación de acuerdo el marco jurídico que aprobé en la 
(militante) el 30 de diciembre. Adelante por favor. 
 
(A moment of signing documents, Maduro’s speech continues after at 44:45) 
 
Bueno, es muy importante lo que se acaba de firmar… se ha firmado… todo esto hay que informarlo muy 
bien a nuestro pueblo… hmm?... informarlo a nivel internacional a través de las embajadas. Nuestra 
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canciller1 está en Nueva York dado que estamos presidiendo el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas… 
y han tenido que estar varias oportunidades. Vicecanciller de África, el decano… y los vicecancilleres del 
mundo. Vicecanciller del Asia, de los que veo aquí… están embajadores de más de veinte países. 
Bienvenidos embajadores, embajador. Queridos y queridas, hmm? 
Hay que informar al mundo que se acaba de firmar precisamente… eeehh... el documento para 
proceder a la certificación de cuatro áreas muy importantes… con empresas de China, y del África, en este 
caso. Son cuatro áreas que tenemos que familiarizarnos los venezolanos con el motor minero. Porque 
además del motor minero, como estaba hablando yo con el presidente de la Corporación de Minería de 
Venezuela, compañero economista, José Salamat Khan… de aquí se desprende?, bueno, no solamente 
aguas abajo… un conjunto de industrias que van a desarrollar y van a llegar a las ciudades más importantes 
del país. Y tenemos que prepararnos desde ya. Toda la economía comunal del país para participar y toda la 
economía social… y la economía en general. 
Se firmó la certificación y el inicio de la operación en el área número uno donde va a tener 
predominancia la investigación y certificación de las reservas de coltán… entre otras…. Además de bauxita y 
diamante… pero tiene predominancia el coltán. Igualmente, el área número dos del Arco Minero… 
hmmm?... donde tiene predominancia el oro aluvial, conocido así… en el río Cuchivero y el río Aro, 
respetando estrictamente con la major… mejor tecnología, nuestra biodiversidad y nuestro ambiente. 
Igualmente se acaba de firmar documentos parar proceder a certificar e iniciar las operaciones en el área 
número tres, entre el río Aro y el límite este del Arco Minero… es de predominancia de bauxita, oro y 
hierro. Y el área número cuatro … la extensión del arco minero donde predomina, fundamentalmente, el 
oro, el cobre, el caolín y la dolomita, es lo fundamental. 
Estos cuatro documentos que se han firmado, bueno, forman parte del plan de motor minero y de 
manera inmediata procede al proceso de certificación y de preparación de las inversiones de la explotación 
y del desarrollo de estas cuatro áreas. No, como áreas como estas, bueno, eeh… Ya están determinadas… 
varias decenas de áreas en el arco minero y están en el proceso de conversación y negociación con 
inversionistas nacionales e internacionales, y con mineros pequeños, medianos y artesanales y el desarrollo 
de las inversiones integrales en el arco minero. 
Igualmente, hemos firmado un documento muy importante… yo le pediría a… el ministro Eulogio 
del Pino que amplíe las explicaciones de el memorándum de entendimiento entre la empresa canadiense 
“Gold Reserve”, presentes aquí y el estado venezolano. Una inversión muy importante… para nuestro país. 
La resolución de un conflicto que, bueno, venia llevándose trabajándose.. y que ha tenido un final feliz… 
ganar-ganar. Para el país, integralmente, en el marco de su constitución y sus leyes y para la empresa gold 
reserve igualmente. Y un conflicto y un pleito que teníamos, ahora somos socios para el ganar-ganar, para 
el desarrollo de un proyecto de más de cinco mil millones de dólares. Por favor, ministro Eulogio del Pino. 
 
(Minister Eulogio del Pino speaks, Maduro’s speech continues after) 
 
Muchas gracias a todo el esfuerzo del ministro Eulogio del Pino… de presidente de la corporación 
venezolana en minería… yo quisiera que el presidente de la corporación venezolana en la minería nos 
hiciera también un comentario sobre la importancia de la activación de este motor minero como hemos 
venido organizando, concatenando todo el proceso para que Venezuela tenga un desarrollo autónomo, 
soberano… como llaman ahí por el mundo: amigable con el ambiente. Nosotros llamamos eso, un poquito 
más allá, más profundo. Un proyecto ecosocialista… hhmm? Respetuoso del ambiente, del ser humano y 
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con un objetivo del desarrollo social de nuestra patria, de nuestro país, por favor, por favor presidente de la 
corporación venezolana de minería don José Salamat Khan 
 
(The president of MINERVEN speaks, Maduro’s speech continues at 58:00) 
 
Muchas gracias. Un aplauso. José Salamat Khan… chino Khan… yo lo he conocido como tal… el chino Khan. 
Nos conocimos hace casi treinta años en las calles en el movimiento sindical. No era tan pacifico como es 
ahora. Era tan apasionado como es ahora también, bueno, todo eso hay que darle conocer al mundo. En el 
mundo entero. Por aquí esta nuestro embajador en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, licenciado 
Maximilien Arveláiz…. Lo invité especialmente para que viniera a este evento con otros invitados, el 
economista Max que nos visita, max… hmm?economista. 
Interesante la campaña electoral en los Estados Unidos, no? Ayer ganó Donald Trump en nevada, y 
Bernie Sanders ahora le está ganando en las encuestas a Hillary Clinton. Algo está pasando en los Estados 
Unidos verdad? El voto antisistema de la izquierda y de la ultraderecha. Vamos a ver que pasa en las 
elecciones, un saludo, bienvenidos embajador. Aunque el presidente Obama todavía no las recibe las cartas 
credenciales a nuestro embajador. Yo espero que ahora, cuando viene el 9 de marzo, presidente Obama 
desestime el decreto de sanciones contra Venezuela y le reciba las cartas credenciales a Maximilien 
Arveláiz… para que demuestre su buena voluntad de relaciones con Venezuela con el ALBA y con 
Latinoamérica, verdad? (aplausos)Sería un gesto sencillo, recibir las cartas credenciales de Maximilian 
Arveláiz como embajador ante los Estados Unidos. 
 
Verdad? Y nos entendemos, nos conversamos. Obama será Obama toda la vida y los Estados Unidos serán 
los Estados Unidos… y Venezuela será Venezuela… la de Bolívar y la de Chávez… toda la vida también- pero 
tenemos que dialogar. Tenemos que entendernos (applause) tenemos que respetarnos. 
Aprovecho, como estamos hablando de minería, para hacer este pequeño comentario. De la 
minería diplomática, hmmm bueno… para ser realidad todo lo que ha dicho José Salamat Khan… todo el 
desarrollo integral… que no se repita el viejo esquema del desarrollo minero destructivo, del ser humano, 
en primer lugar… de la naturaleza, y de los países... superar ese modelo…hmm? Y no se repita menos aún el 
viejo modelo petrolero que se incubó en Venezuela hace cien años. Que destruyó el país, sin lugar a duda, 
no?... Y que desplazó y acabó toda la actividad económica de un país, que hace 100 nos producía todo lo 
que consumía. Un poco más de 100 años. Destruyó la cultura productiva del campo. La sacó del raíz, la 
destruyó. Y llevó a nuestro país un modelo llamado rentista de vivir de una renta e importar lo todo. 
Bastante fuerzas se han hecho para superarlo. 
Pero llegó la hora de superarlo. Esta es la hora. Lo superamos Hoy y ahora o lo superamos hoy y 
ahora. No tenemos ya opciones. La opción es superarlo por la vía del trabajo productivo de articulación de. 
Alianzas de la agenda económica… de los motores, del desarrollo de una nueva economía… todo lo demás 
es falso… Todo lo demás es falso… Y por la vía de desarrollar nuestro petróleo también con los nuevos 
esquemas. 
Todo esto lo digo porque así, como en la faja petrolífera del Orinoco, firmé hace unos días la 
creación de las zonas del desarrollo estratégico de la faja petrolífera del Orinoco Hugo Chavez de las 64 mil 
hectáreas… perdón… de los 64 mil metros cuadrados (someone comments)… kilómetros cuadrados… de la 
Faja Petrolífera del Orinoco para su desarrollo integral. Para desarrollarla como una faja agrícola… 
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productora de alimento… Para desarrollar su servicio vivienda, escuelas, universidades… para desarrollarla 
integralmente… Para desarrollarla industrialmente… la industria ligera etcétera etcétera. Yo voy a proceder 
a firmar, no? , la creación de la zona estratégica del desarrollo integral del Arco Minero del Orinoco para 
darle sustento (aplausos) programática… Sustento programático, orgánico, legal y económico al desarrollo 
integral de todo este Arco Minero del Orinoco. 
En el concepto que ha expuesto de manera breve pero contundente el presidente de la corporación 
venezolana de minoría… de minería hmmm?... Son 111mil kilómetros cuadrados… de punta a punta, del 
Esequibo hasta nuestra hermana Colombia. Y si sumamos Orinoco Norte, 64 mil kilómetros cuadrados… 
Orinoco sur, el arco minero… 111mil kilómetros cuadrados…. Estamos hablando de 175 kilómetros 
cuadrados de desarrollo integral petrolífero, minero, agrícola, humano… 
 
Ese es el centro… el centro de la agenda económica bolivariana. El centro del plan de la patria. Construir 
una nueva economía. Esto solo se va a hacer con gran voluntad. Con gran empeño… pero ademas con una 
guía muy clara…hmm? Plan de la patria, la agenda económica bolivariana hmm… nosotros tenemos un 
proyecto del país muy claro hmmm.. que nos convoca a todos y… que es capaz de integrar todas las 
voluntades… voluntades de nuestro país. Tenemos un plan para enfrentar en cara esta tormenta y salir de 
aquí más fuertes con una vía hacía el desarrollo real, productivo del país. La generación de fuentes de 
riqueza pero ademas tenemos un proyecto… un plan. Tenemos lo más grande que podemos vernos a 
nosotros y que es el amor, el amor profundo por nuestro pueblo… por nuestros hijos... y por el derecho al 
futuro que tiene Venezuela. Eso es lo que estamos construyendo… el derecho al futuro que tiene este 
rincón del planeta tierra que ….. a ser 
Venezuela potencia. Muchas gracias. Activado el octavo motor de minería de agenda económica 
bolivariana. ¡Qué viva Venezuela! (applause). Buenas tardes a todos ustedes, gracias. 
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Appendix B: The news articles 
 
Here is a list of the new articles retrieved from the official web page of the mining ministry of Venezuela. 
The news articles were retrieved from the “news archive” – section of the web page and contains all the 
news stories, in chronological order, from August 2nd, 2016 to March 30th, 2017.  
Link of the archive: http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/archivo-de-noticias/  
All links were accessed on May 11th, 2020. 
 
1. 2016, August 2nd , “Minerven impulsará Motor Minería Ecológica de la Agenda Económica 
Bolivariana”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/minerven-impulsara-motor-mineria-ecologica-
de-la-agenda-economica-bolivariana/  
2. 2016, September 25th, “Programa de Recuperación de las zonas y riberas del Río Caroní (Galería)”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/programa-de-recuperacion-de-las-zonas-y-riberas-del-rio-
caroni-galeria/ 
3. 2016, September 25th,  “Iniciado programa de recuperación de la cuenca del río Caroní”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/iniciado-programa-de-recuperacion-de-la-cuenca-del-rio-
caroni/ 
4. 2016, October 7th, “Gobierno Bolivariano arrancó en Guayana plan piloto para legalización de la 
actividad minera”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-bolivariano-arranco-en-guayana-
plan-piloto-para-legalizacion-de-la-actividad-minera/ 
5. 2016, October 12th, “Realizadas Mesas de Trabajo con comunidades indígenas cercanas a las minas 
Paso Diablo y Mina Norte en Zulia”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/realizadas-mesas-de-
trabajo-con-comunidades-indigenas-cercanas-a-las-minas-paso-diablo-y-mina-norte-en-zulia/ 
6. 2016, November 18th, “Reincorporación de Venezuela al proceso Kimberley facilita acceso al gran 
mercado internacional de diamantes”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/reincorporacion-de-
venezuela-al-proceso-kimberley-facilita-acceso-al-gran-mercado-internacional-de-diamantes/ 
7. 2016, November 22nd, “Gobierno Bolivariano promovió oportunidades de inversión minera en 
Australia”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-bolivariano-promovio-oportunidades-
de-inversion-minera-en-australia/ 
8. 2016, November 28th, “Fundición del primer lingote de oro ecológico producido por los pequeños 
mineros del estado Bolívar (Galería)”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/fundicion-del-primer-
lingote-de-oro-ecologico-producido-por-los-pequenos-mineros-del-estado-bolivar-galeria/ 
9. 2016, November 28th, “Gobierno Bolivariano incorporó 39 Brigadas Mineras Socialistas al nuevo 
modelo productivo nacional”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-bolivariano-
incorporo-39-brigadas-mineras-socialistas-al-nuevo-modelo-productivo-nacional/ 
10. 2016, November 28th, ”Golpe de timón minero”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/golpe-de-
timon-minero-galeria/ 
11. 2016, December 4th, “Restauradas más de 180 fachadas de viviendas y recuperados 11 espacios 
públicos en La Pastora”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/restauradas-mas-de-180-fachadas-
de-viviendas-y-recuperados-11-espacios-publicos-en-la-pastora/ 
12. 2016, December 6th, “Pequeña minería aportará al país más de 3.500 millones de dólares por año”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/pequena-mineria-aportara-al-pais-mas-de-3-500-millones-
de-dolares-por-ano/ 
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13. 2016, December 20th, “La Pastora renovó su cara con el Plan Caracas Bella y Socialista (Galería)”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/la-pastora-renovo-su-cara-con-el-plan-caracas-bella-y-
socialista-galeria/ 
14. 2017, February 7th, “TECMIN cumple 31 años al servicio del desarrollo minero”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/tecmin-cumple-31-anos-al-servicio-del-desarrollo-minero/ 
15. 2017, February 13th, “Gobierno Bolivariano promueve fortalecimiento del sector minero mediante 
conjunción de esfuerzos”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-bolivariano-promueve-
fortalecimiento-del-sector-minero-mediante-conjuncion-de-esfuerzos/ 
16. 2017, February 19th, “Jorge Arreaza nuevo Ministro de Desarrollo Minero Ecológico”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/jorge-arreaza-nuevo-ministro-de-desarrollo-minero-
ecologico/ 
17. 2017, February 20th, “Jorge Arreaza asume el reto de impulsar el desarrollo minero ecológico y 
humanista”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/jorge-arreaza-asume-el-reto-de-impulsar-el-
desarrollo-minero-ecologico-y-humanista/ 
18. 2017, February 22nd, “Ministro Arreaza destaca importancia del Motor Minería como fuente de 
riqueza para la inversión social”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ministro-arreaza-destaca-
importancia-del-motor-mineria-como-fuente-de-riqueza-para-la-inversion-social/ 
19. 2017, February 23rd, “Espacio y tiempo en Revolución”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/espacio-y-tiempo-en-revolucion/ 
20. 2017, February 24th, “Venezuela y Palestina firman memorandos de entendimiento en el área 
minera”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-palestina-firman-memorandos-de-
entendimiento-en-el-area-minera/ 
21. 2017, March 1st,  “Ministro Arreaza llama a la clase trabajadora a acelerar desarrollo del Motor 
Minería”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ministro-arreaza-llama-a-la-clase-trabajadora-a-
acelerar-desarrollo-del-motor-mineria/ 
22. 2017, March 2nd, “Motor Minería apuntala plan de reactivación de Loma de Níquel”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/motor-mineria-apuntala-plan-de-reactivacion-de-loma-de-
niquel/ 
23. 2017, March 2nd, “Motor Minería apuntala plan de reactivación de Loma de Níquel (Galería)”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/motor-mineria-apuntala-plan-de-reactivacion-de-loma-de-
niquel-galeria/ 
24. 2017, March 5th, “Ministro Arreaza: El Comandante Chávez siempre será visto como un referente 
para cambiar el mundo”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ministro-arreaza-el-comandante-
chavez-siempre-sera-visto-como-un-referente-para-cambiar-el-mundo/ 
25. 2017, March 5th, ”Ministro Arreaza recibe al presidente de Nicaragua Daniel Ortega (Galería)”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ministro-arreaza-recibe-al-presidente-de-nicaragua-daniel-
ortega-galeria/ 
26. 2017, March 7th, “Ministro Arreaza destacó importancia de alianzas estratégicas para desatar 
fuerzas productivas de la minería”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ministro-arreaza-destaco-
importancia-de-alianzas-estrategicas-para-desatar-fuerzas-productivas-de-la-mineria/ 
27. 2017, March 9th, “Venezuela intercambió experiencias con empresas internacionales para 
fortalecer sector minero”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-intercambio-
experiencias-con-empresas-internacionales-para-fortalecer-sector-minero/ 
28. 2017, March 12th, “Gobierno Bolivariano celebró primer año de los CLAP en Delta Amacuro con un 
despliegue por varias parroquias (Galería)”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-
bolivariano-celebro-primer-ano-de-los-clap-en-delta-amacuro-con-un-despliegue-por-varias-
parroquias-galeria/ 
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29. 2017, March 17th, “Mineros del estado Bolívar participaron en mesas de trabajo para continuar 
avanzando en el Plan de Regularización”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/mineros-del-
estado-bolivar-participaron-en-mesas-de-trabajo-para-continuar-avanzando-en-el-plan-de-
regularizacion/ 
30. 2017, March 17th, “En reunión del Consejo Popular de la Minería ministro Arreaza invitó a aunar 
esfuerzos para acelerar Plan de Organización y Regularización (Galería)”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/en-reunion-del-consejo-popular-de-la-mineria-ministro-
arreaza-invito-a-aunar-esfuerzos-para-acelerar-plan-de-organizacion-y-regularizacion-galeria/ 
31. 2017, March 18th, “Gobierno Bolivariano acelerará Plan de Organización y Regularización de la 
pequeña minería”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-bolivariano-acelerara-plan-de-
organizacion-y-regularizacion-de-la-pequena-mineria/ 
32. 2017, March 20th, “Gobierno garantiza que actividad minera en el país respete el medio 
ambiente”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-garantiza-que-actividad-minera-en-el-
pais-respete-el-medio-ambiente/ 
33. 2017, March 21st, “Venezuela y Sudáfrica buscan establecer alianzas estratégicas en sector 
minero”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-sudafrica-buscan-establecer-alianzas-
estrategicas-en-sector-minero/ 
34. 2017, March 22nd, “Pequeños mineros participan en reimpulso de la Misión Piar”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/pequenos-mineros-participan-en-reimpulso-de-la-mision-
piar/ 
35. 2017, March 25th, “Juramentan a 500 efectivos de la GNB que resguardarán zonas mineras del 
país”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/juramentan-a-500-efectivos-de-la-gnb-que-
resguardaran-zonas-mineras-del-pais/ 
36. 2017, March 26th, “No está planteado ampliar poligonales de intervención de carbón en Zulia”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/no-esta-planteado-ampliar-poligonales-de-intervencion-de-
carbon-en-zulia/ 
37. 2017, March 26th, “Arreaza: Venezuela ha comenzado a superar el rentismo petrolero”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/arreaza-venezuela-ha-comenzado-a-superar-el-rentismo-
petrolero/ 
38. 2017, March 26th, “Gobierno Bolivariano activará Fondo Social Minero para atención integral a la 
pequeña minería”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-bolivariano-activara-fondo-
social-minero-para-atencion-integral-a-la-pequena-mineria/ 
39. 2017, March 29th, “Nuevo modelo de producción de la minería contempla cuatro planes 
estratégicos”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/nuevo-modelo-de-produccion-de-la-mineria-
contempla-cuatro-planes-estrategicos/ 
40. 2017, March 29th, “Relanzamiento de la Misión Piar garantiza beneficios para los pequeños 
mineros del estado Bolívar”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/relanzamiento-de-la-mision-
piar-garantiza-beneficios-para-los-pequenos-mineros-del-estado-bolivar/ 
41. 2017, March 30th, “Gobierno organiza sector minero para garantizar una minería ecológica”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-organiza-sector-minero-para-garantizar-una-
mineria-ecologica/ 
42. 2017, March 30th, “Ejecutivo Nacional aprueba recursos para activación plena de Carbozulia”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ejecutivo-nacional-aprueba-recursos-para-activacion-plena-
de-carbozulia/ 
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Appendix C: News articles about foreign involvement in mining 
 
Here is a list of the other new articles retrieved from the official web page of the mining ministry of 
Venezuela. The news articles were retrieved from the “news archive” – section of the web page and 
contains news stories, in chronological order, that were selected to represent news stories with foreign 
involvement in the Venezuelan mining ventures as the main theme. They are a collection of articles 
dating from April 26th, 2017 to November 24th, 2017.  
Link of the archive: http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/archivo-de-noticias/  
All links were accessed on May 11th, 2020. 
 
1. 2017, April 26th, “Venezuela y Sudáfrica se enfilan en la creación de empresa mixta para desarrollo 
de actividad diamantífera del país”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-sudafrica-se-
enfilan-en-la-creacion-de-empresa-mixta-para-desarrollo-de-actividad-diamantifera-del-pais/ 
2. 2017 April 28th, “Venezuela y Angola fortalecen alianzas para el impulso del sector diamantífero 
nacional”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-angola-fortalecen-alianzas-para-el-
impulso-del-sector-diamantifero-nacional/ 
3. 2017, May 12th, “Venezuela y Chile profundizan intercambio para consolidación de la industria 
minera”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-chile-profundizan-intercambio-para-
consolidacion-de-la-industria-minera/ 
4. 2017, May 17th, “Venezuela dice presente en Latin America Down Under 2017”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-dice-presente-en-latin-america-down-under-
2017/ 
5. 2017, May 22nd, “Gobierno Nacional trabaja junto a la pequeña y gran minería en zonas donde 
coinciden”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/gobierno-nacional-trabaja-junto-a-la-pequena-y-
gran-mineria-en-zonas%e2%80%8b-donde-coinciden/ 
6. 2017, June 3rd, “Firmada declaración conjunta de cooperación en materia minera entre Venezuela 
y Suráfrica”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/firmada-declaracion-conjunta-de-cooperacion-
en-materia-minera-entre-venezuela-y-surafrica/ 
7. 2017, June 30th, “Venezuela fortalece alianza con Bolivia para el impulso de la minería nacional”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-fortalece-alianza-con-bolivia-para-el-impulso-de-
la-mineria-nacional/ 
8. 2017, July 20th, “Venezuela y Angola firman memorando para creación de empresa mixta 
diamantífera en el Arco Minero del Orinoco”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-
angola-firman-memorando-para-creacion-de-empresa-mixta-diamantifera-en-el-arco-minero-del-
orinoco/ 
9. 2017, July 21st, “Ejecutivo Nacional firma alianzas estratégicas para fortalecer el Motor Minería”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ejecutivo-nacional-firma-alianzas-estrategicas-para-
fortalecer-el-motor-mineria/ 
10. 2017, July, 28th, “Alianzas estratégicas con empresas mineras internacionales generaran riquezas 
para inversión social”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/alianzas-estrategicas-con-empresas-
mineras-internacionales-generaran-riquezas-para-inversion-social/ 
11. 2017, August 14th, “Pueblo minero se moviliza en defensa de la soberanía”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/pueblo-minero-se-moviliza-en-defensa-de-la-soberania/ 
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12. 2017, August 14th, “Pequeñas y pequeños mineros rechazan injerencia del gobierno de Donald 
Trump”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/pequenas-y-pequenos-mineros-rechazan-injerencia-
del-gobierno-de-donald-trump/ 
13. 2017, August 14th, “Buque con más de 47 mil toneladas de carbón venezolano zarpa hacia Europa”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/buque-con-mas-de-47-mil-toneladas-de-carbon-venezolano-
zarpa-hacia-europa/ 
14. 2017, September 9th, “Ministro Cano: Leyes constituyentes incentivarán y protegerán inversiones 
en el Arco Minero”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/ministro-cano-leyes-constituyentes-
incentivaran-y-protegeran-inversiones-en-el-arco-minero/ 
15. 2017, October 4th, “Venezuela estableció con Rusia líneas de investigación e inversión mineras”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-establecio-con-rusia-lineas-de-investigacion-e-
inversion-mineras/ 
16. 2017, October 5th, “Venezuela se luce con potencial minero en Turquía”, 
http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-se-luce-con-potencial-minero-en-turquia/ 
17. 2017, October, 16th, “Empresas palestinas y autoridades mineras revisaron acuerdos para 
explotación de coltán”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/empresas-palestinas-y-autoridades-
mineras-revisaron-acuerdos-para-explotacion-de-coltan/ 
18. 2017, November 22nd, “Instalan mesa de trabajo de la Comisión de Alto Nivel Rusia-Venezuela 
para acuerdos económicos”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/instalan-mesa-de-trabajo-de-la-
comision-de-alto-nivel-rusia-venezuela-para-acuerdos-economicos/ 
19. 2017, November 24th, “Venezuela y Rusia coordinan alianza científico-técnica por una minería 
responsable en el país”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/venezuela-y-rusia-coordinan-alianza-
cientifico-tecnica-por-una-mineria-responsable-en-el-pais/ 
20. 2017, November 24th, “Científicos rusos apoyarán a Venezuela para avanzar a una minería 
responsable”, http://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/cientificos-rusos-apoyaran-a-venezuela-para-
avanzar-a-una-mineria-responsable/ 
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Appendix D: Development plans 
 
Here are listed the two national development plans of Venezuela. I accessed both of them through the 
Regional Observatory on Planning for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, which among its 
other functions, presents development plans of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
The two plans are listed below. Note that the development plan of 2013-2019 presents no publication 
information (date, place…). 
 
“Plan de la Patria: Segundo Plan Socialista de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación, 2013-2019” 
Retrieved from: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Regional Observatory 
on Planning for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean [online] 
https://observatorioplanificacion.cepal.org/es/planes/plan-de-la-patria-2013-2019-de-venezuela 
 
“Plan de la Patria. Tercer Plan Socialista de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación, 2019-2025”, 
published April 8th, 2019, Caracas. 
Retrieved from: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Regional Observatory 
on Planning for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean [online] 
https://observatorioplanificacion.cepal.org/es/planes/plan-de-la-patria-2019-2025-de-venezuela 
 
